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A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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EDITORIAL

THAT vital and necessary thing which is called by the dull name of Institutional Religion is attacked from two quarters. On the one hand, it is said to be ultra-rationalist. Thus, in a short notice of Mr. Kenneth Ingram's *Modern Thought on Trial* in the *Adelphi*, the reviewer says that "like so many modern 'religious' books, it is completely rationalist and optimist in outlook." Commenting on the author's remark that "the modern reaction from institutional religion is mainly emotional," he says: "It very likely is, and for the reason that modern institutional religion is pretty well bankrupt of emotional force." On the other hand, Dr. Kirsopp Lake, in the learned, sombre commentary on current affairs, as well ecclesiastical as civil, to which he has given the title of *Paul: His Heritage and Legacy*, after making some reserve on the ground that for Catholics "the Sacraments are not merely means of religious experience," says that the liberal Protestant churches have given themselves to "a deliberate attempt to satisfy a desire for emotional excitement which sanctifies itself by the claim that it is religion. *Corruptio optimi pessima*, and this perversion of Protestantism, which is filling its pulpits with men who have no special knowledge of any special thing, but are moderately skilful in the art of moderately emotional utterance, is destroying Protestant Christianity more rapidly than anything else." Dr. Lake here and there concedes a slightly superior survival-value to Catholicism, but it does not, in his judgment, amount to much. In the main, what he conceives to have happened is this: all the real Christian leaders have been mystics ("mysticism is the very heart of personal religion"), and "the tragedy of Church history is that their successors, who frequently were not mystics, emphasized the language, regarded the metaphor as description, and ended by changing mysticism into mythology." "Polemical Protestants" dislike being told that early Christi-

anity was Catholic and sacramental. But even if it were, that does not matter much, because "the question at issue is the value of Sacraments at all." The conclusion is that Catholicism, while not religious enough to be genuinely mystical, attaches an irrational importance to antiquated things.

In this way we have two opposite criticisms. They are both common enough. They could be multiplied to almost any extent from current literature and journalism. It would be too simple merely to observe that they cancel out, like plus 1 and minus 1. We cannot simply neglect both of them and go on uttering our same old statements with an increased emphasis due to the fact that our statements have now been questioned in two quarters instead of one. But it only needs a slight acquaintance with the principles of the Hegelian dialectic to know that the truth sometimes, even if not always, emerges from a clash of opposites. It is not that the average is necessarily true; the Anglican method is not so easy as all that. Dialectic is a deliberate method of intellectual enquiry and approach which proceeds on the principle that contradiction is not final, and that synthesis is always to be sought. There is no space here to attempt to describe the historical steps by which the Church of England, either in pre-Hegelian days or with very various degrees of conscious Hegelianizing, actually developed its own method. But there is no doubt that the method which we possess and use is of that kind. To be Catholic and at the same time what Canon Jennings would call Pro-testant (see p. 36), to be orthodox and liberal, to be rational and mystical, that is the badge of our tribe.

How do we arrive at this synthesis? Bishop Gore points out in his Gifford Lectures (p. 184) that *Eros* is a feeling or passion which cannot be controlled or summoned at will, which a man can seldom experience towards God, or towards men in general. *Agapé* "does not signify any sort of emotion, but a deliberate disposition of the will—something which is within everyone's control if he choose to have it so." From this, taken by itself, it would seem that Christianity is an affair of the reason and the will. But there are other facts to be considered. One is the super-fact of Christ. Our Lord makes His appearance in the field of history and in the field of experience. He confronts you and demands: "What think you of Christ?" His first impact is in the region of the numinous. The initial response is that of the disciples in the boat: "Who then is this?" (Mark

iv. 41), or that of the officers of the Sanhedrin: "Never man so spake" (John viii. 46), or the Samaritan woman. The reaction then passes to the conscience, then the will and then the reason. The co-operation of the reason is essential, but as a rule it does not begin until some other things have already happened. There is a contemporary example of what is now confessed to be the unsatisfactory nature of purely intellectual conviction. Mr. Arnold Lunn has in his earlier books argued shrewdly for the truth of Christianity. But it is, as he has told us, only recently that an act of moral submission has revealed to him the full richness of Christian faith. The fact that his submission was made in a quarter to which we ourselves own no allegiance makes no difference to the principle. The principle is that firing on one cylinder is not enough.

The other fact alluded to is one mentioned by Bishop Gore in the same book. He "cannot allow any antithesis between faith and reason; for no satisfying account can be given of the soul or self of man which does not recognize in faith a primary function of reason." He does not even speak, as a famous Cambridge preacher once did, of a sphere where "faith is not afraid to reason, and reason is not ashamed to adore." He brings the two faculties, faith and reason, into a unity. Neither can move effectually without the other. The Bishop was sure that Christian belief was the most rational of all the interpretations of the world. But he never maintained that it was capable of absolute demonstration. The Henry Sidgwicks of this world, so charming in their moral simplicity, so relentless in their logical demands, ask for too much.

Canon Jennings, in a letter which we print elsewhere, appears to class Mr. Ellis Roberts among those who hold *omne Romanum pro mirifico*. He refers to the bad record of the Papal government in the last century. He could have strengthened his case for a more recent period by reference to Mr. C. C. Marshall, *The Roman Catholic Church in the Modern State* (Faith Press, 3rd ed., 1931). There is no reason whatever to believe that Mr. Ellis Roberts would defend any of the indefensible things. It is simply that he is to a very happy extent free from prejudice against Rome, as Pusey was, as the late Lord Halifax was. Such freedom may easily lead to an excessive admiration for things Roman, and an unnecessary and unfilial disparaging of our own liturgical and ceremonial customs. It may lead to underestimating doctrinal differences which exist. But of that we saw no sign in Mr. Ellis Roberts's article. Freedom from hostile prejudice is in itself an admirable thing. With what

we take to be the main positive position of Canon Jennings we have no kind of quarrel, and we agree that there are occasions when controversy is a necessity. But let such occasions be as rare as possible.

Everyone ought to read Mr. F. Brittain's *Latin in Church* (Cambridge University Press, 3s. 6d.) It is designed to put an end to the practice of pronouncing Latin in the modern Italian way on the alleged ground that it is "ecclesiastical." The word ecclesiastical, used like that, is nearly always to be suspected. Printers bind books in an unpleasing purple, and Church furnishers produce ornaments with meaningless designs, and put up this catchword in their defence. Mr. Brittain, who is Librarian of Jesus College, Cambridge, and, it would seem, of the Roman obedience, shews clearly that there was never an ecclesiastical pronunciation of Latin. By reference to St. Jerome, Erasmus, Lipsius, Milton and others, he proves that the custom was to pronounce Latin according to the national speech of the pronouncer. So far as England is concerned, "the philological Nag's Head should therefore be consigned to oblivion with the liturgical Nag's Head, or even before it." The modern convention of "chees and chaws" came in with the ultramontane ex-Anglicans of the nineteenth century, notably F. W. Faber. Everything connected with the Church of their baptism ("Mother damnable") was obnoxious to them. The hereditary Roman Catholics, with whom, to his eternal credit, stood Pugin, convert though he was, were startled and offended by the new diction, as indeed by other and more serious novelties. The Benedictines, always scholarly, survived for a time, and the Jesuits still maintain their independence. Dr. Adrian Fortescue maintained his at Letchworth till his lamented death in 1923.

The text of the Sadler's Wells London Church Pageant, *The Rock*, by T. S. Eliot (Faber and Faber, 2s. 6d.), is now available, and very good reading it is. Our only criticisms are that it is difficult to grasp at a single hearing, and that the modern London working-man does not speak as he is here made to do. Ethelbert, Alfred and young Edwin are at once too intelligent and too illiterate. But what a blessed relief, after the Wardour Street lamb-doodle sometimes put forward as the language of Church-plays, to have words with a bite in them, full of wit, satire and poetry. It is a genuine modern exposition of belief in the Church, as an ancient, unpopular, hard-pressed, conquering, divine society. It is modern in that it is aware of the modern situation (we even have the Douglas scheme of Social

Credit—"that bein' the case, I say: to 'ell with money"), and of Red Shirts, Black Shirts and so forth, but in a deeper sense it is modern in that we have in it the *confessio fidei* of a modern Churchman, a real faith expressed in the language of to-day. Above all it is a pageant, with Mellitus, Rahere and even Nehemiah to reassure the builders of to-day. The time-series is used with freedom. Bishop Blomfield comforts the leader of the Chorus with a reminder of the Crusades, and we at once see a mediæval Bishop giving the Cross, with Latin prayers and benediction, to two young Crusaders, and the next moment the twentieth-century builders are patting one another on the back because the difficulties have miraculously vanished. We congratulate the diocese of London on having secured Mr. Eliot to write their book.

The *Annual* of the Presbyterian Church Service Society (Messrs Innes, Cupar, Fife, 5s.) is an illustration of the happy modern tendency of which the Liturgical Movement in the Roman Catholic Church is an example of another kind. It emanates from a liberal and enlightened group of Presbyterians who are eager to make public worship more devout. Dr. G. A. Johnston Ross writes charmingly of what has been done in Honolulu and could be done elsewhere. There is a historical account of "the Lifter controversy." This does not mean what we call Elevation (which is "always done in those Presbyterian churches where the old paths are adhered to"), but the "taking" of the Bread before the Prayer of Consecration is recited. There are some valuable suggestions for the conduct of the Sunday evening service. A new Church Anthem Book is described, "a collection which has no Stainer in it, no Barnby, no Martin, no H. H. Woodward. A brave book indeed!" There are some very liberal reviews, including a warm appreciation of Canon Mozley's little book on the Gospel Sacraments, which we take the opportunity of commending again to our own readers as a quite admirable piece of profound learning, expressed in plain language.

The Northern Council of the Church Tutorial Classes Association have arranged a Conference on Adult Religious Education at Bede College, Durham, from Monday, October 1, to Wednesday, October 3. The Bishop of Durham will preach the inaugural sermon, and the Lecturers will be Professor Burkitt, Professor Kirk, Professor Lightfoot, and the Archdeacon of Auckland. Accommodation (12s.) will be provided at the College. Application to the Rev. Dr. Popham, 213, Gilesgate, Durham.

THE "REGNUM DEI" AND THE MODERN WORLD*

IN spite of much that is to be deplored, it is yet true that the Middle Ages have a power of fascination from which men have never shaken themselves free, if indeed they have ever really wished to do so. In that five hundred years which lies roughly between the rise of the Normans and the beginnings of modern Europe, there was a security in certain departments of life which has never since been achieved or maintained. In the midst of much that was brutish, uncouth, cruel and sometimes shamelessly wicked, there was set the pearl of great price, the Church as the visible kingdom of God upon Earth. It was the Church, mainly through the influence of the monastic orders, which had kept alive the light of learning and culture in those barbarous days which followed the southward movement of the Goth, the Vandal and the Hun. It was the Church which had welded together the German peoples after the coronation of Charles the Great, and had given to men the vision of Christendom. It was the Church, largely through the work of the cathedral schools, the universities, just beginning to live, and of the Dominicans and Franciscans, which rekindled that light of learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and brought about that glorious Renaissance, for which the years 1100, or even earlier, to 1400 will be for ever famous. In the days of communes, corporations and guilds, there stood, over against and above them all, one great Corporation, embracing all men in its fellowship, not only those of one town or country, but all dwellers in England and France and Germany and Italy, claiming from them obedience, promising for them rewards or punishments, covering the whole activity of their days. There was, as I have said, a certain security, which perhaps has never been so completely achieved since. Men knew what they believed, what they must practise as Christians, how they should live. Heaven and the saints, Hell and the spirits of evil, sacramental rites and corporal works of mercy, were all matters of reality and sober earnestness, unquestioned, unchallenged, supreme. Atheism and the modern wistful agnosticism were, it is fair to say, unknown. In the things of the spirit there was a security of mind which yet holds its sway over our hearts, however much we may feel that the dark side of this picture, which I have made no attempt to portray, was indeed unutterably sinister. Those years from

* A paper read to the Concord Club, Manchester.

1000 to 1500 mark *par excellence* the triumph of the *Regnum Dei*; it is, I repeat, a glorious vision in spite of its tragic failure.

But was it ever the Divine purpose that the Church should attain such a pre-eminence over the lives of men? And how came it that it was believed that in the Catholic Church, as she appears in the Middle Ages, there was manifest the one kingdom of God upon Earth? A consideration of some passages in the New Testament and in the early Fathers will be of use in finding answers to these questions.

It is undoubtedly true that Our Lord came to found a kingdom, though it is hardly true to say that all His parables of the Kingdom of God relate to the Church in her organized life. The Kingdom of which He speaks is both visible and invisible; it is both present and to come. The Church, as the mediæval world saw it, was a visible society, a city set on a hill; its boundaries were easily recognizable, the limits of its jurisdiction clearly defined, though in the ideal state they would be coterminous with the life of man. So closely organized was this Divine society that it was possible to say *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. The invisible kingdom, in the heart of man, of which the Lord speaks, was overshadowed by the splendour of that visible kingdom which all could see; and yet there is no doubt that it was the intention of the Lord that His followers should be bound together in the organized life of a community, with certain principles of conduct, certain methods of organization, certain badges of Christian profession. In its ultimate reality the Kingdom is the Reign of God. The body of Christian people, which is the Church, is ever moving onward from imperfection to that goal in which the reign of God will be everywhere acknowledged; and in this sense of transcendent reality the Kingdom is yet to come, for its consummation must tarry till in the hearts of all men there is the will to submit to the rule of Him Who is Lord and Christ. A careful reading of the parables of the Kingdom, and of Christ's directions to His Apostles, leaves us in no doubt of His intention that men should live in the fellowship of a society, bound under certain rules of government, and yet laying emphasis upon principles rather than upon law. In history it has too often happened that the aspect of law in the Christian society has been emphasized, sometimes, as it seems, to the neglect of those principles which lie at the root of the law; religious revivals have not infrequently owed their strength to a recall of men's minds to some forgotten or overlaid principle. And yet it is worth remembering that the supreme purpose of the Incarnation was to reveal to man the nature of God, and that the divine society was established in order that, through its corporate witness and the power of its sacramental

grace, that Nature might still be revealed to men. It is still the main work of the Church to reveal to a sometimes incredulous world the Nature of God as the ground of moral action no less than of religious activity. The Church appeals to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as being at once the sanction of her moral claims and the ground of her assurance that she has something uniquely precious to offer to men. Thus, though it is right to speak of the Church as being founded by Christ with principles and even laws of conduct, it is more important to consider the Church as called to be the revealer of the Divine Nature as Christ her Head revealed it.

The principles of the Kingdom are pre-eminently worked out in the Epistles of St. Paul; they are seen to be principles of worship, of sacramental grace, of personal and social morality. The company of baptized believers makes up the Body of which Christ is the Head. He is head, not as a king aloof from His people, but as being identified with the whole body, which coheres in Him. "I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me." This, which was true in the great Apostle personally, is to be true of the whole body; so we see that St. Paul is in line with his Master: Christ, living in the individual, indwelling the whole Body by His gift of the Holy Spirit, still reveals the nature of God to the world. It has been said that the one great sacrament is the Incarnation and that the Church, the body of the Incarnate Lord, is the means whereby men lay hold of the reality, which is God, and reveal that reality to the world. Justification for this point of view can clearly be found in the later New Testament writers; it is implicit throughout St. Paul's teaching. The Church possesses a supernatural character not only as deriving it from her Head, but as manifesting supernatural truth to the world.

Witness to this supernatural character is to be found from the moment we leave the New Testament period. The Didache, Justin Martyr, The Shepherd of Hermas, in different ways, and to strengthen particular points of doctrine or discipline, declare that the Church is "holy," and this conception of holiness has an important bearing upon the nature and authority of the Church as these early writers understood it. She is holy not because of what we might almost call the accidental goodness of her members, though they were "called to be saints," but because in herself, as the Body of the Lord incarnate, as the temple of the Holy Spirit, as the witnesser to men of the truth of God, and of His Nature, she is holy; that is to say, her holiness is organic and objective, apart altogether from the individual condition of her members. It is this objective holiness which gave the Church so great an authority over her children in the days before Con-

stantine, which inspired Cyprian to write his immortal treatise on the Unity of the Catholic Church, and, a little later, when civilized society was falling in ruinous heaps as the Goth swept down from northern Europe to Africa, compelled Augustine of Hippo to take up his pen and paint the picture of the City of God, which ever since has inspired lovers of Christ and His Church to establish universally the rule of God, the *Regnum Dei*.

Without question the *De Civitate Dei* was the basis of that mediæval point of view, concerning the position of the Church in relation to the civil government of the world, to which we have already drawn attention. Augustine is claimed as the founder of the great Church of the Middle Ages, and consciously or unconsciously, ecclesiastical statesmen such as Gregory VII. or Innocent III. moulded their policy upon what they conceived to be his teaching of the Kingdom. A development of Augustinianism that mediæval conception certainly was, but he would be a rash man who identified the Church of the Holy Roman Empire in its political content with the *Civitas Dei* of Augustine.

The sack of Rome by Alaric was regarded as the greatest tragedy yet enacted on the stage of human life; it was under the stimulus of that tragedy that the *De Civitate Dei* was written; and its purpose was twofold. Augustine must meet the challenge of the pagan world, namely, that under the old gods Rome had flourished, after the victory of Christ her overthrow was accomplished; and, in the second place, it was his business, partly as a continuation of the former theme, to shew that the city of God was destined to become supreme over the lives of men—that the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdom of our God and of His Christ. This latter argument has been seized upon to support the proposition that in temporal no less than spiritual affairs the Church is to be supreme. It lies at the root of the political conceptions concerning the Holy Roman Empire; it was the real bone of contention in the long struggle about Investitures in the eleventh century, and in part, at least, it was a cause of the Reformation movement in the sixteenth century. But it is unfair, and indeed untrue, to claim Augustine's sanction for these developments of his teaching. His thought is not so clear-cut, simple, and practical as to allow of such a conclusion. In all his writing he is concerned deeply with the kingdom of reality, which, as he sees it, consists only of the timeless, the immaterial, the good. Known to God alone, in this world of shadows, is this kingdom of reality; so, obviously, it cannot be that the visible kingdom upon earth, the Catholic Church, is coterminous with the Kingdom of God. Not all of those who belong to the divine society belong of necessity to

the Kingdom, and equally there may be some who do not belong to the visible Church at all, and are yet members of that Kingdom. This is not to say that he could tolerate schisms in the Body such as those with which we are so shamefully familiar today; his treatment of the Donatists is sufficient evidence for this; it is the business of the Church at all costs to preserve the unity no less than the holiness of the Body. So, though the Church is the City of God, and ideally she is also the Rule of God upon earth, only in the last day will those who are the true members of the Kingdom stand revealed; in short, the tares must grow with the wheat until the harvest, and the fact of their intermingling with the good grain cannot vitiate the claim of the whole field to be the city, though, clearly, it is not as yet identifiable with the Kingdom of Reality.

As in their political thought men dwelt more and more upon the visible city, to the exclusion of this invisible kingdom of reality, the importance of the Church in her corporate capacity and her authority over men's lives became increasingly greater. The rule of the Church on earth was the rule of God Himself; as earthly kingdoms had systems of government with higher and lower governmental officials, so the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in its external authority grew side by side with civil officials, and indeed, with the growth of the Canon Law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, largely overshadowed them and usurped their functions. Nor was it an unreasonable aspiration, springing from this general point of view, which would place the Bishop of Rome as Christ's vicar upon earth, and grant to him a sovereign authority, first in matters purely spiritual, and then in political and social affairs. So, extravagant though we may regard the claim today, it was not so startling to the men of his time when Boniface VIII. declared: "We declare, we say, we define and pronounce that to every human creature it is absolutely necessary to salvation to be subject to the Roman pontiff." Extravagant this claim undoubtedly was, but it pointed to an ideal, it emphasized the need for unity, and it envisaged a great company of Christian people knowing what they believed and witnessing to their faith in the claim of the Church to be the guide of men's lives in morals and social responsibility, no less than in doctrine and spiritual edification. The ideal was never realized by the mediæval Church; the revolution of the sixteenth century postponed its fulfilment yet more.

Corruptio optimi pessima: we need not elaborate the theme. As we look at mediæval society with all its splendour, with its almost unquestioned acceptance of the claim of the spiritual to be paramount, we know how terrible was that corruption, and we are not surprised at the length to which Reform

movements went in many directions. But, apart from the aspect of revolt against things as they were, what was the attitude of the Reformers towards the visible kingdom of God, and what did they suppose its functions to be?

It is generally accepted that in part the Reformation was the expression of that spirit of individualism on its religious side which was already manifesting itself in national ideals, the rise of the middle class and the economic changes of the age. Perhaps the best and most enduring contribution both to morals and religion which the Reformation made was its insistence upon personal responsibility; it was in part a rediscovery of some elements of Pauline theology; in part, it was due to a new emphasis upon the atoning work of Christ and of the work of salvation individually considered; and, of course, it was due in part to a revolt against the glaring contrast between the high spiritual sanctions claimed by the Church and the general standard of conduct, at least among the higher ecclesiastics. It might be supposed, therefore, that the reforming leaders stood for religious or political liberty; but such a point of view is utterly untrue to fact. Not only was such liberty quite alien to their whole outlook, the verdict of history upon some aspects of their work is that it was more oppressive in temper, more rigid in discipline (at least in intention), and quite as insistent upon the right of the Christian society to dictate to kings and governments as was ever the Church, which in part it overthrew. The one Christian society embracing all the world was as fundamental to Luther and Calvin as it was to Hildebrand or Boniface VIII.; but as the centuries have passed Protestantism, however it has developed, has steadily lost grip upon the world. One of the most obvious characteristics of Protestant forms of religion has been personal devotion to Christ, often of the most vivid and splendid kind, but coupled with a disregard for the prosecution of social righteousness, which we might be tempted to consider cynical, if we did not know that the personal element has become so strong that there is no room, at times, for the wider issue to come into view.

Lutheranism, with its insistence upon Justification by Faith only, has developed a personal piety, too often subjective in character and submissive in outlook so that the Erastianism of the Lutheran State-Church is no offence to conscience. Dr. Barry, in his book *The Relevance of Christianity*, says that Lutheranism is haunted by the spectre of having to choose between pietism and secularization, and that it is hard to dissent from the view of a modern German writer that "Lutheranism is the Protestant way of despairing of the world and of claiming victory for the religious ideal without engaging the world in

combat." Perhaps in one sentence, in spite of the danger of such a generalization, we might say that the Lutheran idea of the Church's function towards Society is to bear witness solely through the leaven of individual righteousness, having no aggressive policy of her own.

If this be true, it is in direct contrast to the Calvinist ideal. Calvinism in its attitude towards the world and the part Christianity should play in relation to the State, has much closer affinities with the Catholic Church than has Lutheranism. Calvin would identify religion completely with worldly activity; every department of the life of man was to be regulated not only by Christian principles, about which there could be no controversy, but by a regimentation enforced by the religious group in which a man lived, so that the Church, as he conceived of it, held absolute and supreme dominion over all issues, be they spiritual or political, personal or social. The history of the Puritan settlements in America is sufficient evidence for this. His system of government was a theocracy *par excellence*; he overthrew a pope in Italy in order to establish a papacy of "The Institutes" in Geneva, or wherever his followers might settle. It was not a personal papacy, it is true, but its spirit is essentially papal, and Calvinism is as authoritarian as ever was or is the Church of Rome. And yet it also, like Lutheranism, has failed. I cannot do better than once again quote from Dr. Barry: "In effect, therefore, the Genevan discipline creates a new ideal of Christian character, which was only too readily accepted by the rising mercantile classes. Worldly asceticism, as Weber calls it, with its sanctification of thrift, fitness and energy, preaches the gospel of work for work's sake. . . . And as success in the worldly calling is a manifest sign of divine election, the practical conclusion is close at hand that God helps those who help themselves, and that the amassing of business profits is the surest sign of doing God's will. In this way, by an astonishing reversal of all that its founders dreamed of and stood for, Puritanism became the effective drive behind the Industrial Revolution and inspired the *laissez faire* philosophy. . . . Calvinist religion identified itself so completely with worldly activities as to find in the end that the world was too strong for it."

I think it is beyond question that Protestantism in all its differing modes of expression and organization has failed to accomplish that task proper to the City of God, which is to bring all human activity into obedience to Christ. The work of the City, however imperfectly accomplished, with whatever peccable agents, has as its aim but one purpose, that the Kingdoms of this world shall become the Kingdom of our God; and post-Reformation religion has failed, not only to do this, but, as it seems to me,

even to uphold such an ideal before men. The Roman Church of the Counter-Reformation has failed no less signally than the Protestant bodies; but her failure is due to other reasons. She has maintained an attitude of isolation, which at least in Protestant countries has seriously hindered her work of witness as to public morality or social justice. In spite of what may be said to the contrary, the post-Tridentine Church is vastly different from the corrupt but splendid Church of the Middle Ages; but it has been so greatly on the defensive, and over large areas in Europe so definitely a sectarian body, that it has been disproportionately concerned with the maintenance of its own life, and unable to come out boldly as the City of God.

I have said nothing as yet of the position of the English Church in this regard, nor do I propose to say much. As in Protestantism generally, the Church of England, like Augustine himself, has never resolved the conflict between the idea of a visible and an invisible Church. Where the idea of the invisible Church is strong, the sense of corporate witness, and of its vital necessity in a world which lieth in the evil one, is correspondingly weak; and the converse is true. On its practical side it is at least tenable that the supreme value of the Oxford Movement is a quickened sense of the Church's duty to society morally and sociologically considered. It has been the genius of the Church of England, as it has often been to her a source of weakness, that she has maintained a close connection with civil government, and not seldom in recent years has been able to point the way to higher principles; but it is none the less true that she has from time to time appeared supine to the verge of cynicism, and has laid herself open to the charge, often not fully deserved, of preferring Cæsar, for which word we may read Establishment, to spiritual freedom.

By way of summary so far it may be said that there have been two main lines of thought with regard to the Church in relation to the world around her. The first, which claims Augustine as its authority, would subordinate all civil government to ecclesiastical rulers; the earthly Kingdom of Christ is held to be a government not only within the limits of her own converted members, but as the ideal world state, ruling absolutely within limits which she alone can and ought to define. This was the ideal of the mediæval Church, and though it never was universally accepted in practice, at least in theory lip service was paid to it. The other point of view could, I think, equally claim Augustine as its authority, for it lays its stress upon the invisible Kingdom of Christ in the hearts of His people; it is concerned with personal piety and looks rather to the permeation of society by the leaven of individual righteousness than by the active work

of the Church-State. The verdict of History is that both these ideals have failed to achieve their purpose, and the reason for this failure is not far to seek on both sides. It remains to consider what should be the position of the City of God in the modern world.

A theocratic Church-State is no longer possible, nor is it desirable; the practical business of civil government is no part of the Church's function. Though it is part of her mission to be deeply engaged in social problems such as housing and wages, her officials—i.e., mainly the clergy—are not called upon to be architects of the houses which must be built, nor arbitrators in trade disputes. On the other hand, an attitude of *laissez faire* towards the pressing problems of today, a *laissez faire* because Christian people are absorbed in the business of saving their own souls, is an outrage upon conscience. It is repeatedly said that one of the hopeful signs in an age which has invented for itself the new word "defeatism" is the remarkable quickening of a social conscience. Undoubtedly this is true, but there is a real danger lest the Church should be absorbed in humanitarianism, and, in fact, capitulate to a new humanist movement. Is there no danger that she may make terms with the world? In some measure, at least, it is true that the tide of life is rushing past her, not heeding what she has to say on the new problems of morality, or of society, in view of the imminent break-up of the present economic conditions. The tide flows past her because it is believed either that she has nothing to say or, if she has, that it is out of date. It is easy to paint the picture in darker colours than is fair, and Church people are in as great danger of yielding to this spirit of defeatism as any others; indeed, in some ways they are in greater danger, for they have been told repeatedly that "the Church has failed." The Bellman declared that: "What I tell you three times is true." If mere repetition were the test of truth, then our conviction of the Church's failure should be so assured that nothing could rouse us from the slough of despond. Of course it is not true, but that is not to say that we can float down the stream of Time in a spirit of easy optimism; the City of God must be alive and at work in this age, which Arnold Lunn characterizes as "The Flight from Reason."

The urgent need and the most promising way in which the City of God can be established is to recall men to a sense of ultimate values, or, if you like, to seek the Kingdom of Reality. This is essentially an age of disillusion; machines, not men, are the masters of life in every department. Economic laws are still spoken of as though they had the force of Natural Law; man is caught up in a machine of his own making, which it is

no longer in the power of his hand to control, and the Christian Society as a whole seems impotent in the face of the grim spectre of a Robot which lurks behind every fresh discovery or invention of civilized man. When challenged by the might of Imperial Rome, Christ said: "My kingdom is not of this world"; and Westcott, in his *Commentary on St. John*, points out that this claim means that His kingdom does not derive its origin or its support from earthly forces. It is the other-worldliness of that kingdom which is to win the kingdoms of this world to His allegiance. The time is ripe, as it is promising, for a bold declaration on the part of the Church about ultimate values and the modern criterion. Prophets of this new message are not wanting, and we may thank God for them; but they are still individuals trying to call the whole Church to action. The Archbishop of York, in his Scott Holland Memorial Lectures in Liverpool in 1928, says, speaking of the problem of whether at a given moment it would be right to make war: "A nation which was ready to suffer annihilation rather than stain its soul with the passion of war might save both itself and others." It is perhaps hardly fair to tear this passage from its context, because Dr. Temple goes on to point out certain conditions which must be present before such a tremendous act of sacrifice could be justifiable. But dramatic and tremendous as such an action would be, and even supposing that so utter an act of sacrifice could ever be undertaken, the message to the Church and to the world which lies behind his illustration is of incalculable value. Identification of the Church with humanitarian activities cannot save the world; an interest in housing schemes, in labour conditions, in marriage and family life, useful and indeed necessary as these things are, is comparable to an operation for cancer. Such an operation, as we know, does not get to the root of the trouble; the real saviours of humanity from the cancer scourge are the men at work in research laboratories; and that is not to say that there is no place for the surgeon's skill. So it is in the work of the Church as she tries to establish the City of God in a well-nigh distracted world. She must call that world back to the ultimate realities; she must declare in the face of all contrary opinion the values of God. Not by a use of the things of this world alone, if at all, can that kingdom be established. Human personality is more sacred than machines and money; the new mechanism exalts speed of production above every other consideration; Christ Incarnate has raised human nature to a dignity inexpressible, beyond all price, sacred above every thought or purpose.

It is often said that the individual conscience must be the final court of appeal in matters that seem to be doubtful; and

it is further claimed, with considerable truth, that this has always been the method of the English Church as she deals with problems of conscience, and that by this method a certain virility of mind and heart has been produced. There is much to commend such a point of view; it is calculated to produce a quality of character better in every way than that which is nurtured upon authoritative pronouncements, and so to speak, by putting the penny in the slot, receives the appropriate article in return. But it can become too individual in its working, so that conscience is left to grope unaided and, in the answers it finds by the inner light, is led by prejudice rather than knowledge. The Church must steer a middle course between regimentation and complete personal freedom; though from time to time she is bound to say quite unequivocally that a particular line of thought or action is right or is wrong, she will do her best work in the field of morals and ensure the Christian victory by a continual presentation of those ultimate values which are revealed in the Person of Christ and His teaching. Men are rightly tired of sermons urging them to be good; they want to know, and they will listen if they are told, what goodness is. Equally, vague humanitarian utterances about Beauty, Truth, and Goodness will not avail. Those qualities must be linked up with Christ and His message to the world; they must be shewn as living principles of the Incarnation, involving service and self-restraint no less than bringing joy and power.

And so we come, full swing of the circle, back to our starting-point; the City of God in the New Testament is the company of baptized persons making up the Body of which Christ is the Head, indwelt by the Holy Spirit, instinct with the life of Him Who is the Life of Men. The Incarnation is emptied of half its meaning if its social implications are ignored; salvation is personal and individual, but it is corporate also; society is to be redeemed no less than each of its members. These things are the commonplaces of Christian theology, and perhaps for that very reason are taken for granted, and so, largely forgotten. Now is the opportunity to recall men to these verities which are the very stuff of which the Kingdom of Reality consists. The realization and fresh application of them is the proper work of that City of which we have been thinking. The constant declaration of them will ensure for the City a visible kingdom which shall be the rallying-point of all men of good will; and though the *Regnum Dei* cannot yet be realized, man's feet will be set once more upon the road which leads to that City whose maker and builder is God.

D. ARMYTAGE.

ALMSGIVING AND MODERN LIFE

(Just as this paper is going to press, the sinister figures have been published. The response to the special appeal made to the whole Church of England is nearly £2,000 less than the low figure of 1932-1933 [i.e. £893,623 as compared with £895,549].)

THE purpose of the following article is to shew that from the beginning of the present century certain social customs have been growing which militate against obedience to the one grand practical precept of our Master: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature."

Considering the unique supremacy of the command, the question here raised is of paramount importance. Almost the only way whereby the multitude can obey the Lord is by enabling our messengers to live and work. A definite influence is operating to prevent earnest Church people from contributing what they quite easily might contribute. If we do not counteract it, the reason is that we do not see where we are and what we are doing. We are perplexed and uneasy in all questions connected with money, forgetting that "great is the peace they have who love Thy law."

A personal confession may be permitted. The writer till quite lately was inclined to acquiesce in the standard set by charitable people to-day, many of whom offer praiseworthy examples of self-denial, nor did it occur to him that any definite reform was possible. This blindness has been dissipated by the reading of the notable pamphlet *With One Accord*.

Not many months ago a most stirring appeal was put forth on behalf of the Overseas Missions. Careful enquiry and calculation had shewn that the support of these Missions had declined by ten per cent. since 1929, though the level reached in that year was barely adequate for the maintenance of work already begun and full of hope. Consequently meagre salaries have been cut, and here and there workers have been withdrawn from fields just when the "sowing in tears" was issuing in the "reaping in joy."

Meantime the tendency to increased expenditure on luxuries which has been noticeable for the last thirty or forty years shews no sign of abatement, though we have been living in a time of real financial stress, very heavy taxation, and gloomy forecasts of the future.

The subject, however, in itself one of vast economic and ethical complexity, must be here strictly limited. We are not

concerned to add one more to the emotional appeals made by earnest Churchmen in the hope that a few philanthropists may divert their offerings from some other charity to Missions. We are addressing those who have for a long time acknowledged, in theory at least, the unique claim of the Christian's great commission: (1) that we are in this world to learn to love God, and this we cannot do unless we take in something of His Self-revelation which we call the Gospel: (2) that no duty can possibly take precedence of the support of Mission work to the utmost of our power: (3) that any reluctance to fulfil our commission must be due to a feeble experience of the meaning of the Gospel. For (4) in proportion as the meaning of the Gospel is taken into the heart, the desire to spread it grows in power.

The one social practical command of the Saviour to the Church was "Go ye and teach." The command is addressed to all. We know too that it comes to us through the Church, through Christ—that is, straight from the Throne of God.

Various influences check and enfeeble the response made to the grand challenge of the Church, notably the manifold claims of a complex but insecure civilization and the sudden pressure of impecuniosity after a long period of wealth. All these we must pass by. They present problems too vast for any human brain.

Another influence is at work to-day stealthily and effectually weakening our sense of responsibility to our Master. It is the tendency to seek self-gratification in new small and apparently innocent ways by treating luxuries till they become necessities. Yet from the first they are known to be superfluous; hence we cut into our resources for the support of charitable efforts.

If and when this happens, the indulgences, which at first were sporadically adopted by individuals, before long set up a fashion. The more widely the fashion prevails the more the corporate sense of responsibility for waste and extravagance is benumbed, till it seems to any onlooker as if the general drift of the community into foolishness and disaster is not a subject for criticism or even discussion, seeing that it is irresistible.

At this point it will be asked, "Why flog a dead horse? The mass of the public have always been languid in their support of specifically religious work." This is true; but we have to point out indications of a certain blindness to plain facts and the inferences to be drawn from them, the victims of which are not only the unthinking multitude, but the élite of our Church workers.

What about the expenditure on luxuries? It is a surprising and perhaps inexplicable fact that this expenditure, which had

been growing for the twenty-five years before 1914, shews on the whole a steady increase since the War ended. During the whole course of English history there has never been a period when such a development could have seemed more unlikely. It demands careful consideration.

First, then, is it a fact? In answering that question we have to specify what the term "luxuries" includes. It is by no means a simple question. What is a luxury in one generation becomes a necessary for the next. In other words, as civilization advances, our needs increase and life becomes more expensive every year. Every improvement adds—so we think—to our comfort, and at first is looked at askance by all who have aspirations towards a simple life, hardihood and frugality. But after a time they are bound to admit that the change brings not only more pleasure but a real improvement in life.

For instance, the recent multiplication of hot baths daily means a huge increase in the cost of living and in self-gratification, but it also brings cleanliness and health; so that to-day the increased outlay is advocated and encouraged though it is threatening our water-supply. If the use of hot water on a sumptuous scale was ever believed to be unnecessary, how has it become an urgent need? Other instances abound.

Now it is no part of our purpose to wander in the quagmire of controversy on the line of demarcation between self-indulgence and self-improvement, but to point out certain facts which indicate a growing tendency to waste when not only obedience to the Gospel but reasonable prudence dictates a stern economy. Further, that the social changes now in progress entail expenditure not only on doubtful, disputable indulgences, but on superfluities about which there is no dispute whatever; because if this allegation is true and if it touches on the mode of life, not only of wordlings but of sober-minded and highly esteemed sections of the community, it is high time that we seriously consider whether we are not drifting into disobedience to Divine Law.

What, then, is the principle by which we determine the superfluities in question? One rough test will be found applicable in all cases except those of real opulence and real penury.* Supposing a man finds his income suddenly diminished by ten, twenty, or thirty per cent., the first thing he would do would be to cut off some minor amenity or comfort the loss of which would involve nothing worse than slight inconvenience. It is certain that very many "good" citizens would hesitate to go

* Millionaires are excepted because it seems that no renunciations make any difference. Carnegie told John Morley that he wished to die a poor man and had given away fifty-two millions; yet his income was still growing! By "penury" I mean such poverty as involves under-nourishment of all kinds.

further in renunciation without cutting their charities first. This cut would on Christian principles be the last to be made. But on the principle of conformity to public opinion, the cut would be made early or at once to avoid more than slight inconvenience. Such at least would be the general practice if men were logical. Since 1929 it seems that contributions to Missions overseas have fallen by ten per cent. Considering the severity of the financial slump, is it not reasonable to suppose that there has been a creditable amount of self-denial, else the fall would have been much greater? It is rumoured also that a considerable portion of the deficit has been made up by the response to *With One Accord*. "Anyhow," says the Church worker to himself, "there is nothing more that I can do."

There we should leave the matter were it not that a very disturbing set of facts has been thrust upon our notice during the last few years which forbids an optimistic estimate. Guided by evidences of retrenchment in private life, we can draw up the following list of indulgences which are so far superfluous that the amount of money spent on them might be greatly reduced without anybody being in any way the worse. The total cost to-day is added in the few cases where some precision is possible.

Gambling; Sweets (£50 millions); Tobacco (£120 millions); Cosmetics; Cinema; Excess of food;* Alcohol; Unwanted Presents; Expensive Journeys; Expensive Memorials.

Now it is to be noted first that in regard to all of these certain benefits are claimed if the expenditure is very moderate. (Even cosmetics, we are told, if *very* sparingly administered, make for cleanliness.) The only exception is gambling. In other words, while utility is claimed for nearly all used with moderation, there is no sort of doubt that an immense majority of the population, prompted either by pleasure-seeking or swayed by fashion (or both), waste money which in the aggregate must amount to many millions. If this estimate is disputed, it could only be from the mundane point of view, which is that the first charge on our income is the necessities of life plus harmless indulgences: from what remains charities may be drawn. But we are here enquiring into superfluities which from the altruistic point of view become harmful indulgences as long as urgent Church or social work is crippled for want of support.

The last phrase reminds us of a very necessary discrimination the neglect of which may lead us in an ocean of controversy.

* Less noticeable since the War. Yet in 1920 the late Sir W. Morley-Fletcher laid it down as very probable that nearly everybody who can eats a little more than is necessary. His estimate was hygienic.

Church work overlaps with social or civic work, but it differs from it in so far as its sanctions, obligations, warrants and claims are all *primarily* drawn from religion. They would be (and are) meaningless for all citizens who are unable or unwilling to make their belief in the Unseen World, the Cross of Christ, Eternal Life and Judgment to come, into a living basic principle of conduct. Thus the demand from the Mission field appeals with greatly varying force to different minds. The majority to-day heed it languidly if it seems to promise to cement together the component parts of the British Empire; not at all if no such promise is forthcoming.

The evidence for this allegation is drawn from certain social changes of custom, whereby with almost monotonous reiteration some new invention offers a new amenity or comfort to a multitude who till then have lived quite contentedly without it. Different groups adopt these things in varying fashion: some eagerly for the satisfaction of appetite or for a fresh excitement, or merely to make a show of aping others higher in the social scale; others for the satisfaction of far higher desires, hoping to beautify their environment, or to secure for themselves fresh means of locomotion, and so to add to their effective civic activities. Others again, disliking change, hesitate, forecasting dimly an increased complexity of life, more noise, more bustle, less of solitude and time to think. Before long, however, the new invention is accepted far and wide and the new thing becomes a fashion, then a tyranny.

How stealthily the process works! How easy it is to be quite unconscious that new silken fetters are being woven round our limbs, fair to look upon and easy at first to move in, but before long recognized as an impediment or a positive nuisance against which we feebly groan, bating our breath for two reasons: first, because in some cases the innovation is found to be useful if the rule of moderation is strictly observed; secondly, because the refusal to follow fashion may easily be taken for bad manners, or want of kindness, or lack of refinement, or defective hospitality. A Churchman soon finds that though an invention is not always mischievous because it is new, no fashion is necessarily wise or beneficial because everybody falls to it.

This diagnosis of the situation will, I think, be accepted if we select for examination two or three of the innovations mentioned above.

The giving of presents for no reason except that they are expected, whether they are wanted or not. Wedding-presents, for instance, are given on a scale which has no justification in religion or common sense. It may not be so rigid a regulation

as it was before the War, but thousands of Church people still strain their resources to give more to a rich couple than they would think of giving if they desired only to supply a need. The custom is futile and grotesque even according to the standard of mundane common sense. A modern Juvenal would revel in such a theme. But satire is curiously ineffective for purging society. Meantime from the Christian point of view the custom is not only silly but wicked. A Churchman who knows of a single missionary underpaid and underfed, on the brink of being recalled home for want of a living wage, and who yet allows his charities to be curtailed by the sum he spends on unwanted presents, is guilty of disobedience to our Lord.

Again, not many years ago it was taken for granted that good civic work or faithful official service of any kind was its own reward. To-day such work is often spoken of in terms of ridiculous encomium and rewarded with an expensive testimonial or monument or lengthy biography to which all friends and acquaintances are expected to subscribe. An instance could be given where an official of a club, after rendering service of the lightest kind, was suddenly offered his portrait in presence of a large number of personal friends. Except the proposer of the resolution, not a single man present approved, yet not a word of protest was uttered; but the deepest groans of all were uttered by the recipient of this "honour," who not only detested giving sittings to the artist, but had not a square foot of wall space in his house to hang the picture. Two hundred pounds was reluctantly extorted from the subscribers, and the recipient, after prolonged manœuvring, secured that the poor likeness should be taken off his hands.

Of course it will be said that such culpable folly is to be imputed not to earnest Church workers and self-denying citizens, but to the flabby-minded and heedless sentimentalists who are always with us. The objection is irrelevant even if it be true. Heedless people are the slaves of public opinion. But if that public opinion is silly and inconsistent, who is responsible?

When a wrong custom begins to be established and to work injury, the responsibility rests with highly esteemed people who might correct it but do not. They fail to correct it because in their actions they conform to it, and also—and more frequently—because they think and speak of it as if it were no great matter, a mildly regrettable state of things which will be mended in time; for the present, anyhow, it is unavoidable. Who then to-day are those who can be so described?

We are now getting to the heart of the matter.

In proportion as any followers of Christ are admired because they are strong and self-denying men, if they

are known to conform to any custom which no one imagines to be approved by God, they inevitably strengthen the hold of the custom upon society. Their very virtues become instruments in the hand of the Deceiver of mankind. "If such really good men favour a fashion, it must be that the fashion is commendable."

For brevity's sake the first person plural may be used. What do we Church people think, say and do when we are confronted with the fact that expenditure on luxuries has gone up during the very time that the country has grown poorer and the demands from the Mission field are more insistent, more appealing than ever before? For instance, suppose a really charitable man, who has for years lived without drinking or dispensing wine, has proved for himself that he keeps quite well without it, and has not lost a single friend by curtailing his hospitality. Suppose, again, that he comes into an increased income; do we expect that he will not expand his hospitality to a "reasonable extent," no matter whether or no the planting of the Gospel in Western Australia is crippled for want of funds? If he does so, does anyone blame him or dream that he is disobeying Christ by conforming to the world? But if that is not disobedience, what is? Or again, many thousands of pounds above what were needed were squandered in War Memorials. It is easy to see why. Unfeigned gratitude to our lost brothers and sons seemed to demand sacrifice; and when villages of twelve hundred people insisted on spending six hundred pounds each on obelisks, not a word of protest was heard. Yet at the highest reckoning all due requirements would have been met by one-twelfth of the amount actually spent. How many of us reflected that that enormous excess must have been largely subtracted from charities, or anyhow must have kept charitable donations low? Did we ask ourselves if on the Day of Judgment sentiment could serve us as an excuse for disobedience? Here and there some feeble mutterings were heard about inartistic or useless monuments; but it would have required apostolic courage in a country parson to have breathed a word about the Mission field, though at that very moment men were ready to go from home and kindred aflame with zeal to carry the message of salvation to hungry heathen, but were checked for want of a few guineas. An estimate of a million pounds wasted in this way alone would perhaps be scouted as an exaggeration. But the point is not the extent to which charities were crippled, but the fact that apparently no one gave a thought to charities at all.

At this point critics will remark that individuals of the group in question continue, if they can, to give what they gave before.

That may be. But the group remains what it always has been, a group of mortal men and women *lukewarm* towards the Revelation of their Creator's Love and the demand accompanying it.

One more instance will shew that we have not only been lukewarm but are the victims of a superstition, for tepidity of the atmosphere is always favourable to delusions.

Not gradually, but by leaps and bounds we have become a nation of cigarette-smokers. Lady Hoare, the widow of the late Sir Samuel, often asserted that her husband introduced the first cigarette into England from Turkey, presumably about the year 1860. At first the new thing was received as every new stage in tobacco-smoking has been received, silently and with some suspicion. (The tobacco habit from the very first has never been looked on with unmixed approval, and most adolescents have to face a painful initiation.) But stealthily it grew, and when refined ladies took to it, all scruples seemed to have vanished; and it seemed right and natural that we should encourage our young soldiers each to smoke forty to sixty cigarettes a day, hoping to make life in 1915 a little less horrible for them. Hence the increase since about 1900 has been at least 30%.

"Well," say our Church workers and philanthropists, "what has that to do with us?"

Only this. We have conspired together to build up a fashion which forces us more and more to treat cigarette-smoking as a necessary of life, though forty years ago it was treated *at best* as a superfluity. Further, with the change of sentiment this practice among the educated and well-to-do has increased enormously.* It is now nearly as universal as pipe-smoking has long been among the "working classes," and the question whether it is superfluous or not is seldom raised. Nor would it be worth raising if it were not that any superfluous expenditure in this or any other direction is almost certainly drawn from the fund available for charities.

Now this diagnosis is not made to support any random or impertinent charge of self-indulgence as being common among self-denying, hard-working citizens. The facts do not point to general self-indulgence so much as to a blind subservience to a fashion which dictates a large increase of waste as if it were the working of an irresistible law. Yet all the time there is no such law, or if there is it is not yet irresistible. What facts are here referred to? How has the fashion grown?

It has grown by being encouraged by prominent Churchmen and earnest philanthropists who are generally known to condone and even approve of excess, not only in their own habits but in those of their friends. What, in short, is the effect on the public

* For a conjectural estimate see Appendix.

if one of these leaders of opinion, who is constantly appealing for charitable offerings, is known to smoke fifty cigarettes a day? Nobody apparently accuses him of hypocrisy. Why not? There is only one possible answer. The example of a good man has confirmed the opinion of the multitude, which they were quite ready to form, that tobacco in large quantities is really a necessary of life or something like it. Anyhow, sheltered by that example, they feel they need not hesitate to follow their own inclinations. So the matter is not discussed; or if it is, it is with reference to health or prudence. The claim which is paramount is never touched upon—that is, the Divine command to increase our support to the spreading of the Gospel overseas.

During the twenty-five years of the country's poverty, the fashion has been encouraged not only by an increase of personal indulgence, but by the practice of each householder to keep cigarettes and offer them to every guest that crosses the threshold. This is the last and very recent evidence that the most educated and high-minded section of society is now tyrannized over by a fashion which has long held the multitude of "working men" in its iron grip. If the stealthy undoing of our Mission work is to be checked, the practice must be sternly discontinued.

If this demand is pressed by the Church on those whom it most nearly concerns, a stubborn resistance is at once aroused. Those who assent to every proposition we have stated so far, denounce the proposal for various reasons, all irrelevant to the main issue.

The chief objection may be thus summarized. "You call upon us to stint not self-indulgence but little innocent habits of kindness to others. It is a question of good manners, and has nothing to do with selfishness."

This argument contains a fallacy. To most people it is pleasurable—for the moment—to chime in with the tone of their company, for it secures the approval of others. But acting for that object alone is never right. *Per contra*, to go against a prevailing fashion because it contradicts a principle is not a form of selfishness, it is a form of sacrifice. To the hospitably minded it is always painful to withhold anything from a guest. But it may be plainly right to do so when the fashion is a silly one.*

* The sacrifice required is as nothing compared with that which was made by our forefathers in the case of alcohol. The most hospitable man I have ever met never offers his guests cigarettes, but invites them to smoke of their own as many as they please. There is never the slightest murmur heard. People generally prefer their own tobacco to that which is offered. Nor can it be urged that it makes no difference to the total amount consumed. The question is not one of arithmetic, but of the power of example in encouraging a fashion. But the sum total is also affected. There are people who only smoke when they are in houses where cigarettes are thrust upon them.

In good plain truth the discussion of the excuses always offered for the minimizing of duty is a mere trifling with the subject. They might be worth considering if our temporal pleasures were really and rightly the object of existence and if the memory of Christ's command were an hallucination. But the people we are now addressing believe nothing of that sort; those of them who are acquiescing in customs which make it harder to obey the Saviour of men are victims of a phase—probably a passing phase—of moral blindness. The excuses they make, if they make any at all, are not the real reasons of their conduct. The real reason is that it is almost impossible not to conform to the world in days when the world is more exacting than ever, and when the eternal issues of our earthly existence are for a season and for most of us blurred and dim.

We would fain not close these crude thoughts with a note savouring of legalism or of reproach. Rather let us—readers of THEOLOGY—look unto the rock from which we are hewn. Last year we celebrated with thankfulness of heart the work of the great Tractarians, their teaching, their steadfastness, their piety. But little or nothing was said about their asceticism. Yet Charles Gore told his pupils at Cuddesdon how Westcott preached a sermon at Harrow to shew that there had never been a real revival of religion without asceticism.

Finally, what did the Saviour teach the nascent Church? In the account of the Widow's Mite, what do we make of His paradoxical saying, "Verily I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast more in than all they which have cast into the treasury"? Notice first how careful Christ was to call unto Him His disciples, that from what seemed to them an utterly insignificant incident, they should learn a great law of God's Kingdom and of man's co-operation with God. (Yet He spake not a word of benediction to the poor widow herself. How unmodern all this is!) In what sense, then, did He use the word "more"? He meant that her action was dictated by a mighty love. Man's offerings to God are worthless unless they are the expression of love.*

"God loveth a cheerful giver"; that is, one who is cheered, not vexed when he hears that there are men now waiting in

* A fine tale was told of Dean Hook when Vicar of Leeds. One day when in need of funds for some special object he met a very rich man in the street who, on hearing of the matter, took him to his house and gave him a cheque for £300. Hook thanked him warmly. "Well," said the donor, "you see it is nothing to me." And he waved his hand round, drawing attention to the sumptuousness of his establishment. Hook walked home, put the cheque into an envelope, and returned it with a civil note of regret saying he could not offer to God what the donor had told him had cost him nothing. The rich man thereupon and without delay sold two horses, cutting down what William Law used to speak of as equipage, and in a few weeks sent Hook £1,000.

England eager to take ship overseas and bear the news of Salvation—God's Salvation—to millions of white, yellow and black people; millions in whose hearts the Creator hath set hunger and thirst after righteousness along with the promise that they shall be filled. But there is no money to pay their passage. Missionaries ready, but held back for the want of a little donation. Others are called away from their labours and their sowing of the Word just when the firstfruits of the harvest are ripe to be gathered—immortal souls whom God has especially entrusted to us—simply because the ten per cent. increase of subscriptions is withheld, while we are afraid of what people will say if in one tiny detail we flout a foolish superstition at home!

Perhaps to some we shall seem impertinent in implying that the best section of Church people (except the Religious) have been for some fifty years victims of an insidious fashion whereby indulgences are treated as necessities. That may be. But if it is a fact—and who can deny it?—it is a fact pregnant with a great hope. For, as with alcohol seventy years ago, the change of custom will follow on a change of temper and outlook. The appeal is to those who really desire to do God's Will. To know that Will, and in the strength of a great corporate resolve to do it, is the joy which the world cannot give nor take away.

APPENDIX

AN ESTIMATE OF EXPENDITURE

Out of the £120 millions spent annually on tobacco, suppose we reckon £100 millions as charged to the "working classes," to whom the indulgence has come to be a necessary. They are reckoned as seventy-five per cent. of the population. Then, of £20 millions left, we charge £15 millions to the "educated" classes, who give alms only to secular objects, and to whom *for the present* it would be a waste of time to appeal. There remain £5 millions spent by genuine Church workers and philanthropists. Of this a certain portion we allow as beneficial and not to be given up: say £2 millions. We are left then with £3 millions of superfluous expenditure on the part of the most self-denying section of the public *on one luxury alone*.

If these figures are in error they are so by an underestimate of the moneys available.

EDWARD LYTTELTON.

THE EPICLESIS: A CRITICISM

FR. DIX candidly describes himself as "an unrepentant Western," which does not manifest a very judicial attitude of mind; and his article is a defence of the medieval Western theory of consecration. He begins by arguing that the epiclesis in Hippolytus' *Apostolic Tradition* is a later interpolation, basing his view largely on the fact that it is absent from *Testamentum Domini* (c. 361). The anamnesis of the Latin version of *Ap. Trad.* is directed to the Father; in *Test.* it is directed to the Son. This is a later and Syrian use, and is not found in Egypt until after the time of Severus of Antioch and the spread of Monophysitism. The Dair Balaizah papyrus has, in the anaphoral fragment, many marks of a late date, sixth or seventh century, and of Syrian and Byzantine influence. When Frumentius was sent from Egypt to Abyssinia in the early fourth century, he must have carried with him a liturgy of some sort, as everyone agrees. And this must have been either one with the anaphora of *Ap. Trad.*, or an early edition of the liturgy "of the Apostles," the oldest Abyssinian liturgy, which is an expansion of *Ap. Trad.*, whence most probably its title. In both of these the anamnesis is directed to the Father; and the simpler form of the epiclesis in *Ap. Trad.* is expanded in the anaphora "of the Apostles," though not to the same extent as in later fourth-century forms such as Sarapion's, or that in *Ap. Const.* viii., for the change desired is specified in one sentence: "May He make it the Body and Blood of our Lord," etc. The parallel between the Eucharist and the Incarnation is emphasized by the addition of "and Thy Power" to "the Holy Spirit," from Lk. i. 35. In the anaphora "of our Lord," a compilation based on the Ethiopic version of *Ap. Trad.* and *Test.*, the anamnesis is directed to the Son, not to the Father. It is probably of the thirteenth century. As for the double mention of the Holy Spirit in the anaphora of *Ap. Trad.*, there are parallels in the forms for consecrating the font in *Gothicum* and the Bobbio missal. The problem of why *Test.* omitted an epiclesis for the Holy Spirit when the compiler had one in his source is admittedly difficult, but it is not the only one. Why, for instance, did he omit our Lord's words at the Institution of the Cup? and why did he ignore the Fraction, a thoroughly Scriptural ceremony? As regards the first, the probable explanation is that he was writing in the heat of the Pneumatomachy, and could not tolerate a sentence which asked the Father to *send* the Holy Spirit, when all around him the Macedonians were insisting that the fact that the Father and the

Son sent the Spirit was a clear proof of the inferiority of the Holy Spirit. The *Test.* compiler was a decided Trinitarian.

The words of administration in *Test.* are "the Body of Jesus Christ the Holy Spirit." But the two MSS. of *Test.* are late and not entirely free from errors; the editors, Cooper and Maclean, say with reason that it is far more probable that the copyist inadvertently omitted the words "which is of" (in Syriac the three letters *d, m, n*) than that the late Ethiopic anaphora inserted these words. Moreover, considering the very decided Trinitarian views of the *Test.* compiler, it is not at all likely that he would have passed over the confusion between the Second and the Third Persons without correcting it, even supposing that he found the form thus in his Montanist sources; it is not in *Ap. Trad.*

Fr. Dix (p. 133) says that "Hippolytus deliberately refused to apply to the Holy Ghost the word *Person* of the Godhead." Let us look at the context, always an advisable thing to do when meeting an isolated passage. Hippolytus says (*contra Noetum*, 14): "There are two *prosōpa* (*neut. pl.*) and a third (*fem.*) oeconomy [this seems the better reading than the dative], the Holy Spirit. For the Father is one, but there are two *prosōpa*, for there is also the Son, and the third (*neut.*), the Holy Spirit." *Third*, being in the neuter, refers to *prosōpon*, Person. So far as the treatise against Noetus is concerned, at any rate, there is no hint of bi- or tri-theism. Hippolytus is emphatic in affirming that God is *one* (8, 9, 10, 14), and also in differentiating within the Godhead (12, 14). Naturally he calls the Logos *pneuma*, but he also says that the Son gave the Spirit to His disciples (18).

The wild utterances of the Gnostics can hardly be cited as throwing any light on the early Christian eucharistic prayer. The only Christian thing about them is a few words; the underlying thought derives, at any rate to a great measure, from Egyptian magic, and is not Christian in any sense. Moreover, usually the documents only mention the bread, and the cup, if mentioned, is a cup of water.

The so-called Western theology of the consecrating priesthood of the Son is derived from the East and still held by Orientals. It is mentioned, for instance, by Epiphanius (*Haeres*, lv. 4) and St. John Chrysostom (e.g., *Hom.* ii. 4 in 2 Tim. i. 12); by Cyril of Alexandria (*In myst. cen.*, 5), from whom the passages in the liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom derive (*L.E.W.*, 318, 378); and many others.

Apart from the possible exception of Severus of Antioch, does any Eastern writer ascribe consecration to the recitation of the dominical words by the celebrant? I think not. St. John

Chrysostom writes plainly enough that Christ is the invisible Priest at every altar; that His word "This is my Body," *once for all spoken*, is the ultimate source of the consecrating power. But he gives as a parallel the word "Be fruitful and multiply," *spoken once for all*, which gives power to our nature for procreation of children for all time. But just as this requires a certain human co-operation to bring it into action in any given instance, so too the former requires action on our part—namely, the invocation of the Holy Spirit by the priest—for its effect to-day at each altar. It is not the repetition of our Lord's words by the priest that consecrates, but the prayer for the intervention of the Holy Spirit which brings into action in the particular case the power of our Lord's words *spoken once for all* at the Last Supper. The same idea, but with a different parallel, is found in Pseudo-Ephrem, *De sanct. Christi sacram.*, and St. John Damascene, *De fide orthod.*, iii. 13. But St. Chrysostom does *not* say "Christ (by the Priest) recites," as Fr. Dix (p. 137), nor does he mean it. All these writers have quite a coherent theory of consecration. St. Ambrose's was the same. It is not a question of *two* ideas, but of *one* clear and consistent one.

Pseudo-Dionysius Areop. does not attribute consecration to the dominical words, if Fr. Dix means by this (p. 137) the recitation of those words by the priest. He says that the hierarch completes or consecrates "according to the *logion*," the statement or pronouncement, and shews what he has in mind by saying just before: "We then do this, as the *logia* say," for His anamnesis. The pronouncement was, therefore, "Do this" (not a word of *saying*). So that all that the Areopagite tells us is that the priest consecrates as our Lord bade.

With regard to the letter of Severus, the Monophysite patriarch of Antioch, it is not a little curious that none of his coreligionists at any time, and no Monophysite anaphora, not even that which bears his name and is attributed to the sixth century, shew any reflexion of the idea that the dominical words recited by the priest are consecratory. But is the letter genuine? Or, if genuine, is it unaltered or uninterpolated? In any case, considering his enormous influence and the high opinion held of him by the Monophysites, it is very strange that such an opinion should be so definitely expressed in the letter and found nowhere else in his community. The very early anaphora "of Addai and Mari" definitely settles the question for its users, for it does not contain the narrative of the Institution at all.

On pp. 187-8 Fr. Dix discusses St. Cyprian's theology of consecration. But nowhere does Cyprian say anything about it. He uses phrases such as *legitima sanctificatio*, *in sanctificando*

calice Domini, and *oblatio sanctificari possit*, but not a word as to the form of words by which he held consecration to be effected. Fr. Dix quotes *Ep.* 63, as though that had anything to do with the question. This letter is solely concerned with the question of the mixed chalice; and Cyprian repeats again and again that the sacrifice cannot be properly and validly offered unless the priest imitates what Christ *did*—*i.e.*, use in the chalice water as well as wine. The whole point is in *doing* the same; there is not a word about *saying*. Yet Fr. Dix slips in "words" (p. 188), "saying" (p. 192), as though Cyprian gave warrant for the interpolation; but Cyprian is only concerned with *doing*—*viz.*, mixing the chalice. Here again attention to the context is shewn to be advisable.

The real meaning of Justin Martyr's words in *Apol.* i. 66 is, without much doubt: Jesus Christ was made flesh by *logos* of God; the food is consecrated by *logos* of prayer; that is, the first *logos* is the word or message of Gabriel, and the second the form of prayer, which *form* came from Him—*i.e.*, Christ. In neither case has *logos* any article, and when Justin means the Second Person of the Trinity he almost always prefixes the article. In *Dial. c. Tryph.*, 100 the *logos* of the serpent to Eve is contrasted with Gabriel's message to Mary.

The Apologists, as Harnack has pointed out, distinguished *in thesi* between the Son and the Spirit, but often in practice confused them and identified them. Justin is no exception, but his so-doing throws no light on the content of the form of consecration of his days, for it is obvious that had he heard a petition for the Holy Spirit to come on the oblation, he would at once, with his views of Lk. i. 35, have interpreted it of the Second Person. And although he seems to have gone about teaching, it does not appear that he was an authorized exponent of Christian dogma.

"The phrase 'the *anamnesis* of the Passion' is used by early writers (*e.g.*, Justin, *Dial.* 41, 1; Methodius, *Sympos.*, 3, 8 *inf.*) as the equivalent of 'the Eucharist'" (p. 193). Justin says that the offering of fine flour made on behalf of those cleansed from leprosy (he ignores the other things offered) "was a type of the bread of the Eucharist, which (*masc.* = bread) Jesus Christ our Lord ordered to be offered for an *anamnesis* of the Passion which He suffered," etc. (*Dial.* 41); and again in c. 117: "For these alone [*i.e.*, prayers and 'thanksgivings,' or eucharists] Christians have undertaken to offer, and indeed [do so] for-the-purpose-of an *anamnesis* (*epi* with *dat.*) of their food both dry and liquid, in which (*fem.* = food) is commemorated the Passion." This does not seem to be quite the same thing. But Methodius means something quite different, as is clear from the context. He

begins (ii. 2) by referring to the trance of the first man (during which God drew out a rib from his side, and made Eve of it); the rest of the chapter must be read. Then in iii. 8 he says that the apostle refers what was said of Adam to Christ, who slept in the trance of His Passion so that He might set by His side the Church who receives the spiritual seed, conceives, and gives birth. So the command *increase and multiply* is fulfilled by the Church increasing daily by union with the Logos, "who still comes down to us even now, and falls into a trance during the anamnesis of His Passion, otherwise the Church could not conceive and give birth to believers by the laver of regeneration," and so on. He says that God took the sevenfold Spirit of Truth from the side of Christ during His trance, where "trance" seems to be identified with "His Incarnation and Passion." In viii. 7 he says that the Church travails and gives birth to those who are baptized. The allegorizing is peculiar, but it is clear, on reading the whole passages, that Methodius is thinking not of the Eucharist but of Baptism (cf. Rom. vi. 4; Col. ii. 12).

Fr. Dix claims Irenæus, Tertullian, and Cyprian as attributing the consecration to the operation of the Second Person. But Irenæus does so only as regards the Last Supper; at other times he uses the phrases "receiving the *logos* of God," or "the *epiclesis* of God," "over which thanks have been given," "the *logos* of the *epiclesis*," all as equivalent, and so not referring to the Divine Word, but to the consecration-prayer, as we should say. Cyprian in saying that "the sacrifice which we offer is the Lord's Passion" does not attribute consecration to either Person. Tertullian, however, does attribute consecration to our Lord, but whether in the same sense that Chrysostom and the Greeks do cannot now be determined. But in the quotation from *Adv. Marcion.*, iv. 40, *dicendo* should not be translated instrumentally, *by saying*. If that were correct, Tertullian would be represented as holding that our Lord consecrated the bread after He had distributed it. Tertullian is arguing against the Docetic notion that our Lord's body was merely a phantom (cf. v. 8). He is not discussing the form of consecration, but argues that as our Lord made the bread His body—that is, a *figura* of His body—there could not have been a *figura* unless there were a real body. And he goes on: "And so, in mentioning the cup, and appointing the testament to be sealed with His blood, He confirmed the *substantia* of the body, for there could not be blood of any body except of one of flesh." The context shews that the passage cannot be adduced as evidence that Tertullian thought the dominical words to be consecratory.

On p. 195 Fr. Dix says: "In the fourth-century documents . . . it is no longer the Heavenly High Priest, but primarily the

earthly Church which offers the sacrifice." Nevertheless, Justin Martyr speaks of the bread and the cup which "Christ ordered to be offered" (*Dial.* 41, 117): "We offer sacrifices to Him" (*ibid.*, 41); Christ gave us the bread and the cup "to offer as an *anamnesis*" (*ibid.*, 70). Irenæus says that Christ "gave counsel to His disciples to offer to God the firstfruits of His own creatures," to wit, "the bread" and "the cup" (*IV.*, xvii. 5). And again: "The Church alone offers this pure oblation to the Creator" (*IV.* xviii. 4). So the idea was there in the second century. Similarly Tertullian (*De cultu fem.*, ii. 11; *De orat.*, 19) and Cyprian (*Epp.* i. 3; xii, 2; lxxv. 2; lxxii. 2, etc.). It certainly was not a new idea arising in the fourth century.

Omitting the spurious *Sermones inediti*, St. Austin's eucharistic teaching can be summed up as follows. The Eucharist was blessed and hallowed or consecrated "by the mystic prayer," "by the invisible operation of the Spirit of God" (*De Trin.*, III. iv. 10); by a prayer "prayed over" the oblations (*De Bapt.*, V. xx. 28); a prayer which is also called a "petition" (*Ep.* 149, § 16). The hallowing is also termed "a certain consecration" (*con. Faust.*, xx. 13). He also speaks of the oblation "receiving the blessing of Christ" (*Ser.* 234, § 2); being "hallowed by the word of God" (*Ser.* 227); and of the "hallowing of the sacrifice of God" (*ibid.*). But he does not deem the words of Institution consecratory, at any rate as used by our Lord (*Enarr. in Ps.* 32, 10; *Enarr. II in Ps.* 33, 2). What does he understand by "the word of God"? Possibly he is merely quoting St. Paul; but in general, where the sacraments are concerned, he means the promises of Christ as recorded in the Gospel, which are at the back of all sacraments ordained by Him (*e.g.*, *con. Petil.*, I. vii. 8; II. v. 11; *cf. Ser. de IV^{ta} Feria*, ii. 3). According to St. Austin, Christianity came to Africa from the East, not from Rome (*Ep.* LII, 2; *Ep.* XLIII. iii. 7).

Fr. Dix complains (p. 197) that the orthodox defenders against the Macedonian heresy never once appeal to the epiclesis of the Holy Spirit as evidence of His divinity. He seems to think that they attributed consecration to the Logos. Yet if that had been so, why did not the orthodox writers against the Arians appeal to a Logos-epiclesis as proof of our Lord's divinity? They never did. The obvious reason why, in the Pneumatomachy, no Eastern orthodox writer appealed to the epiclesis, is that in that prayer the Father is asked to *send* the Holy Spirit on to the oblation. Seeing that the Macedonians asserted that the sending of the Spirit was clear proof of His inferiority (Chrysostom, *Hom.* xxix. 3 in 1 Cor. xii. 11; *Hom.* lxxviii. 3 in Joan. xvi. 4; Ambrose, *De Sp. Sancto.* III. i. 7; I. xvi. 156) or of "contempt" (Ps.-Chrysost., *Hom. de Sp. S.*, 11), and, further,

that the orthodox doctrine was not found in Holy Scripture, where was the sense of appealing to a prayer asking for the Holy Spirit *to be sent*, one, moreover, which was not in Holy Scripture? The Matthæan baptismal formula could be, and constantly was, quoted because (1) it was in Holy Scripture, and (2) it set the Three Persons on an equality. Owing to the need for Scriptural proof, the defending treatises became a rhapsody of texts. Fr. Dix did not notice that Didymus of Alexandria (*De Trin.*, i. 36) states that "all things subsist through the Son, while they are hallowed by the Holy Spirit"; and again (ii. 5), "as by the Son all things came into being, so by the Holy Spirit all things are hallowed." Novatian, somewhat earlier, wrote that the Holy Spirit "marks out (*or divides, distinxit, ? ref. to 1 Cor. xii. 11*) the Gospel Sacraments, Who was in them the enlightener of Divine things" (*De Trin.*, 29). Basil the Great wrote (*De Sp. S.*, 49): "The coming of Christ: but the Spirit goes before. Works of power, gifts of healing: but through the Holy Spirit."

"Syrian liturgical traditions in other matters are abnormal (*e.g.*, in administering Confirmation *before* Baptism *without* imposition of hands)." So Fr. Dix, p. 200. He might have mentioned one abnormality—viz., the direction of the anamnesis, sometimes the whole anaphora, to the Son instead of to the Father. But to put the completion of Baptism before the laver is impossible. One can only imagine that he caught sight of the final unction (with "the oil of gladness") of the catechumenate, and the rather strongly worded prayer which really applies to all that is about to happen, and mistook it for the Sacrament of Confirmation, overlooking the unction with the chrism and the accompanying formulæ, which follow after the actual baptism in the font. There is nothing specially Syrian in the omission of the laying on of hands; it gradually died out all over the East, and in the West it is only preserved in its entirety in the Church of England; and we have lost the chrism.

St. John Damascene (*De fid. orth.*, iv. 14) attributes consecration at any given altar to the epiclesis, and not to the dominical words as repeated by the priest; but he is not the first so to do. Numerous other writers do the same—*e.g.*, Chrysostom (already cited), Nilus (*Ep.* I. 44); Isidore of Pelusium (*Epp.* I. 109, 313); Anastasius Sinaita (*Hodēgos*, 23); John Moschus (*Prat. sp.*, 29, 150); Barsauma of Sūs (*P. orient.*, xiii. 572); Mēna in his Life of Abba Isaac of Alexandria (*ibid.*, xi. 356), etc.

On p. 201 Fr. Dix states that at the Council of Florence "the whole of the Russian and a minority of the Greek delegations sided with the Latins *against* the Eastern view, main-

taining that the authentic Eastern tradition agreed with the West on this point." This is a very bold statement, and without serious, not to say drastic, qualifications cannot be held to give a true view of things. At that time Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia were in the hands of the Turks, and only a few years before they had made an unsuccessful attack on Constantinople itself. The emperor was ready to agree to almost anything in order to secure Western help against them. But his clergy were not quite so ready, although they affirmed that East and West were in agreement about the consecration; as Isidore the metropolitan of Kyeff is reported to have said: "Credimus per hoc nos vobiscum esse concordēs." But what did Isidore and Bessarion say was this Latin view? It was that the elements were hallowed by the Dominical words, but that these were made effectual through the epiclesis, a modified version of what Cabasilas had said fifty or sixty years before. Syropoulos noted that this conception did not please all the Greeks; nor did the Latins like it, and so they did not agree. Mark of Ephesus wrote a book afterwards, stating the real view of the Easterns—namely, that our Lord's words supplied the authority for the consecration, and the epiclesis was the application of this to the gifts lying on the altar. But almost all the Easterns who were in the hands of the Turks repudiated the whole business, and would have nothing to do with any compromise with the Latins. Of course, the whole trouble was that the union between East and West was sought for political reasons, and not spiritual and religious ones. The Eastern emperor wanted military help against the Turks, and the Pope wanted the prestige of a reunited Christendom to oppose the supporters of the Council of Basel. The Greeks and Russians never did accept the Latin scholastic position; some tried to make the Latins think they did, but neither side was really taken in. Fr. Dix has a wrong impression of what took place at Florence.

In his final paragraph he intimates his belief that the essential form of consecration consisted of some version of the formulæ recorded in the Gospels; but the earliest witness to the narrative of the Institution coming in the anaphora is Hippolytus, *Ap. Trad.*, and early writers usually ascribe the consecration to prayer and *doing* what the Lord did. To seek for a "moment of consecration" is to lead to division; and since there is no divine prescription of any form, why not be content with acknowledging that the whole prayer is the consecrating form? Reasons of space preclude giving all the quotations in full that one would wish, but they will be found in my book on the Epiclesis which the Alcuin Club is about to publish.

E. G. C. F. ATCHLEY.

MISCELLANEA
CORRESPONDENCE
"CORPUS CHRISTI"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

May I be allowed a word of comment on this important but may be disquieting paper.

The writer is plainly with those who have no use for the Tractarian view of the English Church as pro-testant (not *Protestant*—the difference should be noted) against Rome and Geneva. No short definition can be perfect, but this, on attack, has proved surprisingly capable of self-defence.

Those who now hold "*omne Romanum pro mirifico*" may be invited to study the Italian, not the English, records of the unification of Italy in the last century. Therein historian, biographer, novelist alike tell a very different tale. Enough has been translated to test this assertion.

Nothing is more surprising to the past generation than present-day ignorance, in those who aspire to teach, of the extent to which public opinion in Europe was outraged by the incompetence and oppression of the Papal government.

Long intercourse with Roman Catholic relatives and friends at all events allows one old Tractarian still to believe what he learned at Cuddesdon in the early 'eighties—that it was uncandid to deny the great differences which separated us from Rome, and also that it was not the English Church which must necessarily give way in the approach to Reunion.

Yours obediently,

E. L. JENNINGS

(*Hon. Canon of Gloucester, sometime
R.D. of Cheltenham*).

5, WELLINGTON SQUARE,
CHELTENHAM,
May 4.

MIRACLE

SIR,—May one who believes that truth must always be valued above tradition, however venerable, ask one or two questions with reference to Canon Newell Long's letter in your June number?

(i.) Has he read and considered, and has he or anyone of his school of thought answered, the late C. W. Emmet's *Conscience, Creeds, and Critics*, which was published in 1918? It certainly deserves an answer.

(ii.) Would he maintain that Dr. Tennant should have his licence as a teacher in the Church of England withdrawn after his deliberate and frankly declared conclusion that "alleged miracle is devoid of all evidential value"? The words may be read in his *Miracle and its Philosophical Presuppositions*, p. 93 f. (Cambridge University Press, 1925).^{*} The

^{*} The whole sentence is: "The conclusions to which I have been led have bearing upon this issue (i.e., evidence for alleged fact—a question largely beyond the pale of the field which I have covered). If they convict the still lingering belief in the impossibility of miracle of being credulous acceptance of philosophically and scientifically groundless dogma, they at the same time indicate that alleged miracle," etc.

statement would appear to be far more radical than any disbelief in the evidence for any particular alleged historical event. This slim volume might be styled Prolegomena to all future study of Miracle.

(iii.) While he appears to require from clergy a sharp "distinction between Deity and Humanity," does he profess to be able to distinguish the Divine from the Human in the words or acts of the concrete person of Jesus of Nazareth, "who although He be God and man: yet He is not two, but is one Christ"? Did He not, on Canon Newell Long's view, promise to His followers, who were not Divine, that they should "do greater works than" His, including raising of the dead to life, and other things which might otherwise have been attributed to the Divine element in Him?

Yours faithfully,
G. J. CHITTY.

WORPLESDON RECTORY,

June 4, 1934.

NOTES

THREE PRAYERS

HINDUISM, Islam, and Christianity have each of them a characteristic Prayer for all sorts of occasions. The Gāyatrī of the Hindus, the Moslem First Sura, and the Christian Lord's Prayer have much in common, and Christians will better appreciate their own Prayer by consideration of the other two.

I

All three Prayers are taken from Scripture sources. The Gāyatrī is found in the R̥ig-Veda, which is the most sacred of Hindu texts. R̥ig-Veda lxii. 10 runs:

"Let us meditate on that excellent glory of the divine vivifier.
May he enlighten our understandings."

The First Sura is from the Koran, and reads:

"Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds!
The Compassionate, the Merciful!
King on the Day of Judgment!
Thee only do we worship, and to Thee do we cry for help.
Guide us on the straight path,
The path of those to whom Thou hast been gracious;
Not of those with whom Thou art angered, nor of those who go astray."

The Lord's Prayer is found in St. Matthew vi. 9-13 and St. Luke xi. 2-5—that is, in the very heart of Christian sacred literature.

The traditions about the composers serve to enhance the respect in which these Prayers are held. The R̥ig-Veda Hymns are considered by the Hindus to be divine utterances, revealed to the Rishis or seers whose names they bear. The Gāyatrī is the composition, humanly speaking, of Viśvāmitra, a Rishi of Kshatriya caste, but Hindu devotion makes the claim of a more than human origin for it. Muhammad would have denied that he composed the First Sura at all. The Koran, as he taught, was delivered to him from God through the mediation of the archangel Gabriel. The First Sura was therefore in Moslem estimate composed by God for the use of the Prophet and his followers. There is no direct command in the

Koran to use the Prayer, unless we take as such the remark of Sura xv. 87: "We have already given thee the seven verses of repetition"; but the words of the Prayer are often repeated in later parts of the Koran. Indeed, just as the Lord's Prayer seems to have passed through stages of adaptation to the various needs of private and liturgical devotion, perhaps at the hands in the first instance of Jesus Himself, so Muhammad may have recast his Prayer in slightly different forms for different needs. The Moslems themselves have a tradition that this Sura was twice revealed to the Prophet. Muhammad should have known the Lord's Prayer through his intercourse with Christians, though this was never close, and the First Sura may have some literary dependence on the Lord's Prayer. We may note that both divide in the same way, and that both end with negative clauses. The Lord's Prayer is the composition of Jesus Christ, and if we accept the Lucan tradition as giving the true occasion of its publication, He designed it expressly for the use of His Church. "When ye pray, say, Our Father," etc. (Luke xi. 2). The estimate which Christians have formed of Jesus as the Incarnate Son of God is our warrant for following the example of the Hindus and the Moslems in claiming for our Prayer a divine origin. We may notice a progression in the authors. Viśvāmitra, who is otherwise unknown to history, is much less important personally for Hinduism than Muhammad is for Islam, and Muhammad in turn is much less important for Islam than Jesus Christ is for Christianity.

II

These Prayers are all used for general purposes; they appear in the "Daily Offices" of public worship and are common in private devotions. The Brahman repeats the Gāyatrī daily. The Moslem says the First Sura in each of the five sections of the Ṣalawāt, and upon all special occasions, like visits to the shrines of saints and to the sick, or before engaging in some important business. In each system the Prayer seems to be used primarily to bring forward the soul into the mental atmosphere proper to religion, without definite reference to the meaning of the petitions. The use of Arabic for the First Sura and Latin for the Lord's Prayer further obscures the meaning for most Moslems and Christians, but these languages, just because they are foreign, add to the mysterious attraction of the Prayers. The Prayers are felt to be of God, charged with numinous power, and proper to occasions when the worshippers want to feel close to the object of their devotion. There is danger here of sinking to very low spiritual levels. If a Prayer can be used as a formula for inducing devotional feelings, some may come to consider it as a potent charm for other purposes and use it in the ritual of magic.

III

Yet these emotional and devotional needs would not be met by the Prayers unless deeper insight and more prolonged meditation were able to find in them a genuine and intelligible spiritual value. All three divide easily into two parts: the acknowledgment of divine glory and greatness, and the need of the soul for divine aid. Yet each Prayer in both its parts reflects the special characteristics of the religion which has given it birth. The "Vivifier" in the Gāyatrī was originally the Sun, worshipped in the Nature Cults of the Rig-Veda as Savitrī, the quickener of vegetation and physical life. But the Vedic deities are no longer worshipped in their

original form, and the "Vivifier" may now be any deity to whom the individual devotee is attached, or that impersonal Brāhman who is the source and ultimate reality of all specific manifestations of deity. The Gāyatrī will serve all along the road from the strictest theism to the vaguest pantheism. The same Hindu inability to pin down religious feeling to any definite facts or creed appears in the petition for illumination. It is more than a desire for increased intellectual ability, for it includes the quickening of the feelings. But it does not explicitly touch the moral, and it is the moral tradition which really makes the dogmatics of a religion clear. The Moslem Prayer makes a real advance in this direction upon the Gāyatrī. It presents God as Absolute Creator and Judge, and, though Allah is compassionate and merciful, the Faithful are not allowed to overlook the danger of Hell. The Koran has, indeed, plenty to say about a future punishment, and the sharp separation of the Faithful from the Unbelievers, the good from the bad, has given to Islam its power of conquest and expansion. In the petitions of the First Sura there is a genuine moral force, but there is also the characteristic Moslem identification of the good with the believer. Also the Prayer makes no more than a general moral appeal; it has the moral "form" without the "matter," like Kant's categorical imperative.

The Lord's Prayer seems to take up what is good in the thought behind the other Prayers, and to expand it. Here God is Father, more intimate than Allah, more adaptable to every heart than the indefiniteness of the Gāyatrī. Yet the stress upon heaven marks the Christian's lofty conception of the sublimity and ineffable perfection of the Ultimate Reality. There is indefiniteness here just where all human minds must be indefinite. Again, the "Father" of the Lord's Prayer puts a characteristically Christian stress upon Divine Love in contrast to the Moslem consciousness of impending judgment. Yet the Lord's Prayer knows also that Divine Love has a cleansing moral force, for it admits a contrast between heavenly perfection and earth's best and highest. In the petitions the Lord's Prayer develops the social and individual moral need to a degree quite unrealized in the other two. The Gāyatrī's plea for enlightenment is given with much else in the petition for God's Kingdom; instead of the Moslem's cry for general help we have in the Lord's Prayer a plea for the necessities of outward life and for the inward experiences of forgiveness and strength to overcome temptation. And even in this most inward need there is a social inference. Thus the Lord's Prayer is an advance upon the other two at the higher end of the religious life, where meanings and values count most. It grapples best with what the higher religious consciousness feels to be realities. Yet the other two help to assure the reflecting mind that the needs these Prayers strive to meet are realities indeed, which are urgently demanding attention in circles far beyond the present range of the Christian Church.

J. W. PARKER.

VENI CREATOR SPIRITUS

I HAVE read with great interest Mr. F. Douglas Robinson's paper in the May issue of *THEOLOGY*. It was only in comparatively recent years that I became alive to the fact that Bp. Cosin's version, beautiful though it is, might be described more accurately as a free paraphrase than a translation. There is no pretence of keeping to the order of the lines of the original, and

no less than eight lines—one third of the entire hymn—are not represented by Cosin at all. I was also at that time, strange to say, ignorant of Caswall's admirable translation, and Bridges' less admirable one. Imagining, therefore, that there was no real translation at hand, I set myself to make one. It is curious how closely this resembles Caswall's, which—hidden away as it is in H. A. and M. among the Confirmation Hymns—I never saw till after mine was done. Here it is:

O come, Creator Spirit blest,
Deign now to be our royal Guest,
And fill our hearts with grace divine,
For Thou hast made us; we are Thine.

O Living Gift of God Most High,
Strong aid of all who to Thee cry,
Pure Fount of life, bright Flame of Love,
Pour down Thine unction from above.

The touch of God's Right Hand Thou art,
Thy sevenfold Gift to us impart;
Fulfil the Father's pledge, that we
May own our speech enriched by Thee.

Make every sense to glow with light,
And fill us with Thy love's sweet might,
The flesh is weak; our hearts renew,
Patient and strong Thy Will to do.

Break Thou the force of hostile pow'rs
And let Thy Gift of Peace be ours;
If Thou wilt be our journey's Guide,
No evil shall our steps betide.

Through Thy revealing grace made known,
The Father, Son, and Thee we own;
Adore we then this mystery
In time and in eternity.

J. WYLDE.

BECKENHAM,
Rogationtide, 1934.

SHEMA'

DR. APPASAMY in his charming essay, *An Indian Visitor in the Holy Land*, suggests that the continual recitation of the Shema', "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one," is a hindrance to the Jew who is attracted to Christianity. But need this be so? The Shema' comes to us with the direct authority of our Lord (St. Matt. xii. 29). At least one Liturgy in use with episcopal authority has incorporated it with the Holy Eucharist (*The Meal of the Holy King: A Hebrew-Christian Liturgy*, P. P. Levertoff, p. 7). *Et Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate Veneranda sit.*

Is it quite right to say that St. John the Baptist was a "daring innovator" in his use of baptism? Baptism was required for the admission of a proselyte together with circumcision and sacrifice (*Midrash Sifre on Numbers*, § 108, trans. P. P. Levertoff) and after ceremonial defilement (*Mishna, Pesahim*, viii. 8, trans. H. Danby *The Mishna*, p. 148). See also *Judaism*, S. F. Moore, i. 331 ff., iii. n. 102; and *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, p. 282 ff.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

ST. LUKE xvi. 9

WHEN this verse is read in the Gospel for the ninth Sunday after Trinity, it may not be generally realized that the subject of δέξονται is God.

As is well known, it is usual in Rabbinic writings to abstain from using the name of God, except in Scriptural quotations. Substitutes for the Biblical names of God are therefore used—e.g., "Heaven" (cf. St. Matthew's phrase ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν); "the Name" (cf. St. James ii. 7 τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα, Acts iii. 16 ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ); "the Place." So also the third person plural or the plural participle is used as a substitute for the name of God (this has been pointed out by Dr. W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, pp. 28 and 29, and Dr. Georg Beer, *Abôt*, pp. 61 and 93). Such a substitution is seen in *The Sayings of the Jewish Fathers* (*Pirke Aboth*, "Chapters of the Fathers") as follows: (ii. 16) "If thou hast learned much Torah, they give thee much reward"—i.e., *God gives*, as is clear from the rest of the saying, "and faithful is thy Taskmaster, who will give to thee the reward of thy toil." (iv. 4) "Him that profanes the name of Heaven in secret they punish openly"—i.e., *God punishes openly* (cf. St. Matt. vi. 4); "thy father which seeth in secret shall reward thee." (iv. 5) "To him that learns in order to teach they give the means to learn and to teach"—i.e., *God gives* the means to learn and to teach; the reference is, of course, to the Torah.

The meaning, therefore, of St. Luke xvi. 9 is, "When this world fails God will receive you into His eternal rest."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

REVIEWS

CIVITAS DEI. By Lionel Curtis. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.

The purpose which Mr. Lionel Curtis seeks to achieve in his latest book *Civitas Dei* is to discover a guiding principle in public affairs.

In concluding an historical survey of the social history of man he says, "No political science will furnish guidance in practical politics unless it proceeds from a definite conception of ultimate values." But he is of opinion that these spiritual values which are the ultimate reality and indestructible cannot be proved. "Belief in the true sense of the word is not the assertion of knowledge or dogma, but courage to act on the best hypothesis we are able to conceive." He quotes Goethe to the effect that the "unique theme of the history of the world is the conflict of faith and unbelief." Yet, valuable as is Mr. Curtis's final assertion that action should depend upon ultimate values, this book is disquieting to those who still find their final measure of things in the Catholic faith, in that although the tenuity of his creed does not of itself disturb them, the whole work is painfully modern in the sense that while it reveals aspirations and a longing for ultimate certainties, there is an indeterminateness of conclusion and absence of exact thought. His philosophy may satisfy the sentimental appetites of a bewildered and weary world, but it patently lacks the robust assurance of faith. It is difficult to believe that out of so temperate an appreciation of the significance of Christ in human affairs there will arise any strong resistance to the forces of power, greed and pride which are so menacing to the world today.

The early chapters of this book do not seem to me to be of assistance to the maintenance of the main argument. The history of the growth of the village and tribal society and the origins of early city states are interestingly described. But no principle of assistance in building the Kingdom of God seems to emerge. Jewish, Greek and Roman histories are also discussed. But it is not until we reach the latter portion of the book that its purpose becomes at all clear. The pre-Christian notions of the Messiah as developed by the later prophets are considered, and, in particular, the disastrous limitation claimed to be vouchsafed to themselves alone of the conception of a Righteous God by the Jews.

Mr. Curtis writes with understanding of Christ's purpose to overthrow this limited nationalism and racial exclusiveness and

His refusal to accept the position of national leader, but the whole view of the Lord of Life as presented by the author is entirely inadequate, judged from the Catholic standpoint. Thus, I quote from page 142, "The Gate of Horn": "It is clear that Jesus had in his youth felt himself drawn to throw in his lot with the Zealot Movement. The Kingdom of God on earth as conceived by the Zealots was a nightmare from which he awoke. He also had dreams, dreams which had entered his brain through the gate of horn, that common material which in Homer's mind had stood for realities and common sense."

After this limitation of the nature and purpose of the Redeemer, one is not surprised to find that Mr. Curtis is not prepared to accept the stories of the miracles as they appear in the gospels. He says that he has no doubt in his own mind that Jesus believed "not only in miracles but in his own power to cure the sick by miraculous means. In that age it could scarcely be otherwise." And again, he says: "His religion is too simple and profound to form the basis of a theological system."

The ascension is described as a legend and the eucharist regarded not merely as a sacrifice but also as "a meal at which worshippers partook of the actual blood and body of God. So rapidly sprung the weeds of paganism in fields which Jesus had sown with truth and enriched with his blood."

In his secularization of the whole import of the crucifixion Mr. Curtis parts company with orthodox Christians, but he goes on in particular to deny the Catholic notion of a continued living Church. "The living contact of Jesus with his followers was a short one. As to how far he would have succeeded in purging their minds of the pagan ideas which infected Judaism, if sufficient time had been given him for the task, must always remain a matter of conjecture."

After tracing the triumph of the Church, he speaks of the idea as formulated in the pages of St. Augustine, which, he says, dominated the history of Europe, and says of the Middle Ages that "human society was then conceived as organized in one polity in preparation for that time when Christ would return to judge."

The fact that Mr. Curtis regards this essential and central belief of all Catholics as peculiarly a quality of the Middle Ages, shews how far he and those who think with him have departed from the faith. In these same Middle Ages, he says, "the Church had learned to bestow her favours for cash and replenish her treasure by professing to relieve sinners from the penalties of their sins. Pardoners hawked indulgences through Europe like modern travellers in silks or soap."

Here the book ends: Mr. Curtis again and again, to do him justice, points out that the only salvation for the world is in the Christian practice, yet he denies those sanctions which are so necessary if such practice is to be universally recognized and practised. It is, I believe, a cardinal principle of the Catholic Faith that the nature of God can be established and must be established by the reason. I cannot find any recognition of this in the latest *Civitas Dei*.

As I said, the book is disquieting because I believe Mr. Curtis, a man of good will, must fail as so many other moderns who agree with him will fail, for want of rational faith based upon unquestioned ontological assurance.

H. S.

THE LETTERS OF STEPHEN GARDINER. Edited by James Arthur Muller, Ph.D. Cambridge University Press. 31s. 6d. n.

It is not improbable that in years to come the student will smile a little at the attitude of the nineteenth century to the sixteenth and seventeenth, so far as it is possible to attach an intelligible meaning to language of this kind. For himself the Holy Scriptures will have an appearance quite different from that of a collection of proof-texts, the "Patristic period" an interest widely removed from anything that can be summarily expressed in a series of "catenæ," and he will find it difficult to understand how a man of the intellectual calibre of Newman could write: "In the middle of the fifth century I found, as it seemed to me, Christendom of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected. I saw my face in a mirror, and I was a Monophysite." Yet, if his own interests are historical, the hypothetical student in the future will be either blind or ungrateful if he fails to recognize the permanent value of the great collections of texts, calendars, documents, monographs, even series of translations, for which the zest of controversy provided, either directly or by reaction, painful writers who were willing to work and a public which was willing to pay. In regard to the sixteenth century in particular, the materials available in print are so enormous in bulk compared with those at the disposal of students a hundred years ago that the size of the gaps still remaining is often overlooked. Mr. C. H. Smyth in his *Thirlwall Essay on Cranmer and the Reformation under Edward VI.*, published at Cambridge in 1926, pointed to one which could be partly filled from the Simler collection in the Stadtbibliothek at Zurich. Another was indicated in the same year by Professor Muller in his work on *Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction* (S.P.C.K.), and is at least to a great extent supplied by his new

volume, which will receive, like the former, a well-deserved welcome from all students of the period. The career of Stephen Gardiner was less spectacular than that of Wolsey and less important than that of Cranmer: there are sides of it, especially in relation to his diplomatic activities, which will possibly always have to be judged on the basis of conjecture rather than of ascertained facts; but M. Pierre Janelle, of Strasbourg, in an edition of three of Gardiner's political tracts published at Cambridge in 1930 under the title "Obedience in Church and State," was able to shew how much light a keen and able student could succeed in throwing upon matters hitherto obscure, and it is safe to say that there are likely to be few readers of the Letters now collected who will find nothing to modify any previous estimate that they may have formed.

Some idea of the importance of the service which Professor Muller has rendered to students may be gained from the fact that of the 173 letters in the volume more than half are marked with the asterisk that denotes that they have not hitherto been printed in full, and that many are not even mentioned in the *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII.* or Lemon's *Calendar of State Papers*, so far as concerns the reigns of Edward VI. and Mary. The period covered is a long one, extending to nearly thirty years, from the time when Gardiner was secretary to Wolsey to April, 1555, when Stephanus Winton. Cancell. writes to Bonner from his house at Asshere (Esher) to order in the name of Philip and Mary prayers (enclosed) to be used at Mass in the vacancy of the Apostolic See after the death of Pope Julius III. The collection does not, of course, include the whole of the extant evidence of the writer's epistolary activities: indeed, the editor estimates that the inclusion of all the documents, drafts, etc., in which Gardiner is known to have had a hand would nearly have doubled the bulk. So far as they cover the same period the work must therefore be regarded as a most valuable complement to the *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII.* rather than as in any sense a substitute for what is contained with regard to him in those volumes which students often criticize but for which they can never be sufficiently grateful.

No one certainly is likely to complain of lack of variety in the fare which the correspondence provides. But it is the same Gardiner who writes to remind Erasmus of the salads that he used to make him and to Henry VIII. to report that Pope Clement VII. had said to him "that he wolde, for the welth of Cristendom, the Quene [Catherine of Aragon] wer in her grave; and, as he thought, thEmperour would be therof most glad of al." This was in May, 1529; before the end of July he had become the King's Principal Secretary, to report to Wolsey

within a week Henry's fear of the sweating-sickness said to be prevalent at Rickmansworth; three years later he is Ste. Win. "not lerned in divinite" but defending himself in a letter, here printed from the original, for his share in the "Answer of the Ordinaries," and taking the consequences, but putting to Cromwell, now Secretary, in 1534 the question if he shall venture to ask the King "to take his pastyme in my poore house at Farneham." Is it the same Gardiner, as it is certainly the same man, who writes about the King's Supremacy in 1536 and tells the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge in 1543 that "the Kinges Majestie hath, by inspiration of the Holy Goost, componed al matiers of religion"? These are but a few of the points of interest that present themselves to the reader's eye before he has finished a quarter of a book which with preface, appendices and a good index extends to nearly 600 pages. Gardiner as Chancellor of the University of Cambridge making regulations as to the pronounciation of Greek and entering on an elaborate defence of his principles may not attract all, though in fact he is sufficiently amusing, but—to judge from the correspondence in this volume—Gardiner in the Fleet or in the Tower for other principles and Gardiner as Chancellor under Mary is still the man whom Wolsey and Cromwell knew, and foreign courts, and the heads of Cambridge colleges, and possibly even of a character far less subtle than is sometimes imagined. But it takes a long time to learn how to read the history of any century without imposing upon it the knowledge and the prejudices of our own.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

EXAMINATION OF MCTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY. Volume 1. By C. D. Broad, Litt.D., F.B.A. Cambridge University Press. 21s.

This must be the most thorough and detailed criticism of any philosophical work that has appeared for a very long time. Vol. I. of McTaggart's *Nature of Existence* contains 309 pages; Dr. Broad's examination of it contains 453; and the reader's admiration of his industry will be enhanced by the consideration that, if only one of his criticisms should prove well founded, the whole of McTaggart's fabric will fall to the ground, for *The Nature of Existence* does not proceed by a number of independent arguments converging on to the same conclusion, but by a long chain of reasoning each link of which depends on the previous one. One faulty link is thus sufficient to render the whole chain useless. In spite of this, Dr. Broad takes each link as it occurs and examines it most attentively with the most meticulous attention. By so doing he claims to have found

over twenty distinct fallacies, and his judgment on the final conclusion of McTaggart's work is summed up in the sentence, "It is intelligible, and I know of no reason why it might not be done; but no reason has been produced for believing that it is true" (pp. 452-3). McTaggart has indeed been wounded in the house of his friends!

It is clearly impossible to trace here in detail the course of Dr. Broad's examination, and it must be left to philosophers of his own standing to decide upon the merits of his strictures, though their cumulative force seems undeniable. Readers of THEOLOGY will be more interested in recalling what McTaggart's aim and method were. The point of Dr. Broad's criticisms will then be apparent.

McTaggart's task, as stated by himself, was "to consider what [could] be determined as to the characteristics which belong to all that exists, or, again, which belong to Existence as a whole" (*Nature of Existence*, p. 3). He asserted various *a priori* premises and two empirical ones, all, as he claimed, absolutely certain. Deductive inferences were made from these, and a further (alleged) self-evident premise introduced. It was then claimed that a contradiction could be seen to arise unless a certain additional (not self-evident) proposition were granted. Hence this new proposition must be true. It was of great generality, but could, so McTaggart asserted, be fulfilled in only one special way—namely, by what he called the *Principle of Determining Correspondence*, a complicated principle by which the primary parts of the universe, in conjunction with a relation *R* of a peculiar kind, determine the parts of these parts, and *their* parts, and so *ad infinitum*. He also asserted that the primary parts of the universe were *selves*, and that *R* was the relation of perception.

In its full form Dr. Broad's examination of any one of McTaggart's arguments may be briefly outlined as follows. There are four stages: (i.) McTaggart's argument as he stated it; (ii.) McTaggart's argument as he ought to have stated it; (iii.) examination of McTaggart's argument, which is usually rejected; (iv.) independent examination by Dr. Broad. In any particular case one or more of these stages may be omitted, but this is comparatively rare.

Before remarking on some points of detail, it will be well to make some observations on Dr. Broad's book as a whole. In the first place, it is marked by scrupulous fairness; no care is too great, no analysis too detailed, to elucidate the real point and relevancy of an argument. Then, the style is not only clear but, what is less common in philosophical works, eminently readable. It is enlightened by touches of humour, which give

welcome relief to the closeness of the argument but which are never allowed to take the place of close and sincere reasoning. We wish we could add that they were never painful to the feelings of religious people. There is a hope of irreverence that comes from an unconscious suspicion that religion may be worth while after all. May it be that one day Dr. Broad will turn his attention to theodicy? If so the results may well be surprising. A theodicy by Dr. Broad would be a useful antidote to the sentimentalism and subjectivism of much present-day religious thought. He has one point at least in common with Aquinas; he voices the plain man's protest against mystification. To him, as Mr. Chesterton has said of St. Thomas, "eggs is eggs"; the subject-matter of philosophy is to be found through the senses; a partial truth is not something that is only partially true, but an absolute truth about something that is only a part; and a man does not have to wait for scientists to discover the truth about the inside of Betelegeuze before he can significantly remark that the sky is blue. Verily Dr. Broad is not far from the Kingdom of God, and he is still closer to the kingdom of the Aristotelians. There is at any rate much more that a Christian can welcome in his work than in McTaggart's.

We proceed to some individual points.

On p. 11 Dr. Broad puts up a very interesting defence of his action in embarking on ontology before epistemology. As against popular philosophical psychologism he insists that epistemology rests on certain ontological presuppositions, and not *vice versa* (p. 11, l. 27). Here of course he simply echoes St. Thomas, who places his theodicy before his criteriology on exactly these grounds.

He is less satisfactory when dealing in Chapter III. with existence and reality. Neither he nor McTaggart indicates at all clearly the difference between these terms, and Dr. Broad complicates the issue by introducing the further term "subsistence," which he leaves equally vague. His criticism of McTaggart's use of "part" is important and fundamental, exposing as it does a clear ambiguity, and his reply to McTaggart's claim that negative characteristics exist is devastating (p. 27, l. 34).

One of the most important chapters is Chapter XIV., where McTaggart's "Principle of Universal Extrinsic Determination" is criticized. McTaggart urged that, since everything depends on its relations to everything else, it would cease to be what it is if anything else changed. This is, of course, a common tenet of extreme monism; Whitehead appears to be facing it in his distinction of positive and negative "prehensions" (*Process and Reality*, p. 31). Dr. Broad deals with it more simply and

directly by his emphasis on the distinction between "dispositions" (or "powers") and "situations."

Chapter XIX., on the Endless Divisibility of Particulars (one of McTaggart's "self-evident" principles which Dr. Broad rejects), is excellent, especially the section relating McTaggart's doctrine to other theories; and Book V., which analyzes to the last degree the Principle of Determining Correspondence, is a masterpiece of exposition. Pp. 398-400 and 420 are especially important.

Two points of terminology. "Presupposition" to McTaggart and Dr. Broad means almost exactly the inverse of its meaning in common speech ("presuppose, to imply as antecedent" [Nuttall]). "Being extended" to McTaggart presupposes "being triangular, or square, or . . ." The plain man would say "being triangular" implies "being extended." (A similar inversion of meaning is the physicist's use of "elastic.") Note, however, Dr. Broad's discrimination of presupposition from "partial conveyance" (p. 202). On p. 210, l. 35 (McTaggart, § 184), "requires" is ambiguous. It might mean either "lacks" or "exacts"—two practically contrary meanings. The former is the one used by McTaggart.

A few apparent misprints have been observed: p. 130, l. 2, "§ 62" should be "§ 61"; p. 360, l. 34, insert "every member of" after "term"; p. 374, l. 23, "S" should be "X"; p. 381, l. 11, "P" should be "P₁."

E. L. MASCALL.

NOTICES

TWO ELIZABETHAN PURITAN DIARIES. By Richard Rogers and Samuel Ward. Edited with an introduction by M. M. Knappen, Ph.D. American Society of Church History, Chicago. S.P.C.K., London. 1933. 9s.

Two valuable documents for the history of Puritanism, before it separated from the Anglican Church and became sectarian, are here printed. The MSS. of Rogers' diary are in Dr. Williams' library, London, and of Ward's in the library of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. The necessary bibliographical details appear in Dr. Knappen's preface. He then proceeds to sketch "the Puritan character as seen in the diaries," noting the resemblance in thought and practice between the earliest phase of Puritanism and medieval ascetic life. This has of course been observed before, but he maintains that "current conceptions of Puritan character, based largely on the brilliant but sweeping generalizations of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, must undergo some modification." Though Calvinists, the doctrine of "assurance of the certainty of their election" occupied no

large place in the thought of these early Puritans. The diaries prove that their authors "made much use of Christian fellowship as a means of spiritual growth, and were far from being the lonely souls described in current works."

A brief but detailed account of the lives of Rogers and Ward forms a necessary introduction to a perusal of the rather dull entries in the diaries. Richard Rogers, an Essex man, was born in 1551 and died in 1618. He graduated from Christ's College, Cambridge, and from 1574 onwards was "Lecturer" and probably Curate-in-Charge of Wethersfield, near Braintree, Essex. He also kept a boys' school, and appears to have progressed to a state of moderate prosperity, although often in fear of being deprived of his preaching licence by the diocesan authorities.

Samuel Ward was born in the county of Durham in 1572 and died in Cambridge in 1643, after an academic life, which began with matriculation at Christ's College and ended as Master of Sidney Sussex, and Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. In later years he abandoned his Puritan principles and received several preferments outside Cambridge, but the smallness of academic remuneration in those days and of the other benefices held by Ward perhaps justified this procedure. He assisted with the translation of the Authorized Version of the Bible, attended the Synod of Dort (1619), and the Westminster Assembly of Divines (1641).

The entries in Rogers' diary, covering the period February 28, 1587 to August 26, 1590 reveal the "fearfull noise of warre and trouble in our lande" during the autumn and spring of 1587-8, when Spanish invasion was expected. On July 30, 1588, "when our neighbours were gone to training 3 mile hence on a sodaine there was proclaimed amongst them, when all were not yet come together, that thei must with speed departe to the sea coast more than 20 miles of . . ." On August 13 he reports "at home papistes in multitudes ready to come upon us unawares," but by October he can say: "I have been oft times moved with thinckinge on as late deliverance from the rage of Spain, as memorable as woorcke of God as ever was any in my remembrance."

The entries in Ward's diary are more brief, but cover the period May 11, 1595 to March 2, 1630, supplemented by some "historical notes" from December, 1595 to *circa* 1640. They are more lively in detail and description. In June, 1625 he mentions an outbreak of plague, which is confirmed by some of the London parish registers—for example, those of St. Dunstan-in-the-West and St. Bride, Fleet Street. The London registers show that epidemics of plague proportions occurred in 1593, 1603, 1637, and 1647, but that of 1625 was unusually severe. Possibly the famous outbreak of 1665 has received more attention because of the moving reports of writers like Defoe. Anyhow, it is by the aid of journals such as those which the American Professor here prints, and of parish registers, as well as collections of letters, that the sweeping statements of general historians are constantly being corrected. This edition is limited, so that librarians should secure their copy of this book as soon as possible.

A. J. MACDONALD.

Now I SEE. By Arnold Lunn. Sheed and Ward. 1933. 7s. 6d. net.

It has now become the custom for notable converts to Roman Catholicism to write an apologia in justification of their acceptance of the Papal claims, and if Mr. Lunn's volume is scarcely likely to carry conviction to

serious students despite his appeal to "reason," the author has certainly produced a very readable book. The most interesting sections are those which deal with his personal history and experiences (and not least as a mountaineer), and they are also the most instructive, inasmuch as they reveal, *pace* the publisher's statement to the contrary, how his "instincts, environment and traditions" contributed to the growth of a conviction that at length reached its logical conclusion.

Mr. Lunn explains that not only had he a Roman Catholic great-grandmother, but as a child he was wont "to steal up to see the nuns" in the convent at his Irish home at Midleton, and sometimes he had "the courage to enter the Catholic Chapel," which he describes as "an unprecedented act" in those days. Moreover, whenever he went to Cork for the day, he "never failed to go into St. Patrick's Catholic Church to pray," and one of his best friends in Cork was an Augustinian priest. Even as a baby he had been taken by his mother to a church, where before the altar of St. Francis Xavier she wondered as she prayed whether he would follow in the footsteps of the saint. Therefore at an early and impressionable age he was brought into a Roman Catholic environment, which he found congenial and which at the same time had about it all the romance of the forbidden. And the tendency to surround things tabooed with a halo of sanctity is very deeply laid in the human race.

As he grew to manhood his Catholic instincts developed. He always regarded Switzerland as his real home, and he soon discovered, he says, that "Catholicism was the religion of Europe and that Swiss Protestantism was an exotic growth with no roots in the soil." The bleak Zwinglianism of Grindelwald parish church he found even more depressing than the Anglican services at Roxeth, or those in the chapel at Harrow or Balliol. "Even as a boy," he adds, "I felt instinctively that the rudest Catholic chapel in the remotest of Alpine glens enshrined the poetry of religion, a poetry which has been effectively banished from the temples of Luther and Zwingli."

But although he was temperamentally a Catholic, he did not make any attempt to practise religion till he was received into the Roman Church, which, of course, makes it impossible for him to arrive at any genuine estimate of the spiritual values of his former allegiances. "It was not until I had written to ask Fr. Knox to receive me, that I made an effort, which is still an effort, to pray." Then for the first time he "felt himself bound by the obligations of the Catholic life," but prior to this he had not been to Mass on his own initiative more than two or three times in his life. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that his eyes were opened to a new vista when, after years of soulless controversy, he discovered a spiritual realm in which many who are not Roman Catholics move quite freely and in perfect contentment.

Similarly, on the intellectual side, the absence of any adequate theological or philosophical training is very obvious in his attempts to deal with the deeper problems of faith into which his disputations with eminent opponents have led him. A somewhat inglorious academic career, followed almost immediately by military service in the Great War, left little opportunity for his gaining a sound apologetic, and, as his wife was shrewd enough to realize, his amateurish defence and attacks could but have one result. They must lead him into one camp or the other. Thus she remarked, when he prided himself on having "written a very good letter to Fr. Knox," "You'd better write a good letter to yourself if you want to

remain a Protestant." On another occasion, when he challenged Prof. Haldane to a debate in a similar series of letters, she commented, "Well, I hope you won't go over to his side too."

With his temperament and upbringing, his ignorance of either prayer or doctrine in the Church of his baptism, and his lack of a sound theological education, it was inevitable that he should find his spiritual home in Rome. His reasoning for his conversion is logical enough once his premises are accepted, but the real difficulties lie much deeper than he imagines. A little further investigation of some of his basic assumptions would reveal a foundation of sandstone which he mistakes for rock, and jerry-building is not confined to new houses and "ribbon development."

The book, however, is a challenge inasmuch as it shews some of the weaknesses in the Anglican presentation, or lack of presentation, of the Faith. But if he had moved in a different environment it is possible Mr. Lunn might have seen Catholic life steadily and seen it whole without a flight from reason in its deeper perceptions.

E. O. JAMES.

CHRISTIANITY AND CLASS WAR. By Nicholas Berdyaev. Translated by Donald Attwater. Sheed and Ward. 3s. 6d.

Nicholas Berdyaev has dedicated his latest work to Karl Marx, who was the "social master of my youth, and whose opponent in ideas I have now become." Those who are familiar with the atheistic principles of the famous revolutionary may be surprised to learn that Berdyaev considers him a conspicuous example of the truth of the dictum "that man is incurably religious." The study of comparative religions has revealed the fact that there are traces of similar dominating "patterns" to be found in various types of religions, and Berdyaev suggests that Christianity and Marxianism both belong to the soteriological type, and that their faith finds expression in the same categorical terms. Both worship a "god," both fear a "devil," both place their hopes in a "saviour." For Berdyaev, Marx is less a scientific economist than the "maker of a messianic myth, and the apostle of a mystery religion"; herein lies his real and sinister significance. The "god" of Karl Marx is the communist state, his "devil" the bourgeoisie, his "messiah" the proletariat, his "kingdom of god" universal material prosperity. Marxian values are collectivist, material, and temporal, while those of Christianity are personal, spiritual, and eternal. Thus Marxianism is a "demoniacal perversion" of Christianity, and "fundamentally in diametrical opposition to it." Symbolic of the depths of this perversion is Marx's willingness to fall down and worship the spirit of evil in order to possess the kingdoms of the earth. "He rejoiced at the sight" (of a war among classes drunk with malice and hate), "and hailed it as a supremely good thing, because it would necessarily lead on to the triumph of the messiah class."

Furthermore, contrary to Christianity, the value of individual human personality and the sanctity of creative work have no place in the Marxian scheme of salvation. Man, made in the image of God, is robbed of his dignity, and reduced to the level of a mere cog in a vast machine, indifferent to his very existence. Berdyaev's suggestions for the solution of problems of class war will arouse much controversy; but the situation

is so acute that every serious contribution deserves careful and unbiassed consideration by all men of goodwill. He himself is a convinced revolutionary, and a firm believer in the eschatological character of the present social upheaval. The old order is arranged for judgment, and though its fiery trial must inevitably cause convulsions in every department of human life, Christians should not hinder or deplore the passing of a just sentence of dissolution.

For Berdyaev, as for Marx, capitalism is "the abomination of desolation"; and the bourgeois spirit—lust for gain and power—the "eternal principle of evil." To him it is quite clear that Christians—followers of the Carpenter of Nazareth—"ought to be on the side of work and the workers," and therefore may not repudiate "righteous" class war. Also he sees in racialism and in all forms of nationalism "ebullitions of paganism," to be always and everywhere abhorred by the Church of Christ, if she continue true to her original gospel.

In conclusion, his book is a successful demonstration of the argument he sets out to prove. "Ideas, principles . . . are not enough, and it is no good opposing Marxism with them. The only adequate weapon is Being, deepened and stronger being than that on which Marxism itself rests."

It is indeed true that religions without God are doomed to failure; they bear within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Salvation will not come to society through a royal democracy (Rousseau's myth), nor through the triumph of a messianic proletariat (the myth of Karl Marx). It can only come, as Berdyaev concludes, through the generation from above of a "spiritual aristocracy." The members of this aristocracy, gathered from every class, will refuse to worship in the temples of Rimmon (extreme nationalism), or to bow the knee to the Baal of materialism; but, seeking first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, they will inaugurate a "religious renewal of all mankind."

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

THE SPIRIT OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT. By Christopher Dawson.
Sheed and Ward. 3s. 6d.

MILITANT ATHEISM. By Mgr. d'Herbigny. S.P.C.K. 1s.

CONVERSIONS TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. Compiled by Michael Leaky.
Burns and Oates. 5s.

Hurrell Froude is the real hero of Mr. Dawson's book. He is the central figure in the historic group of men who launched the movement which was to transform the Church of England. Mr. Dawson, who writes as a Roman Catholic without the smallest trace of that bitterness which so often disfigures the efforts of members of his Communion to describe the Church of England, traces with great skill the influence of Froude upon Newman, and through the latter upon English religion. Not only the Tracts, but the *Lyra Apostolica*, owe much to his ardent and impetuous spirit, and Mr. Dawson has, we think, made out his case convincingly though without in the least impairing the devotion which he feels to Newman.

An interesting view of the genius of the Tractarians is here developed. They were politically in line with Southey and Coleridge rather than with their "Church and State" contemporaries, and their "Toryism" had little in common with the Erastian High Churchmanship summed

up in the phrase "High Toryism, High Farming, High Churchmanship, and old port for ever!" D'Israeli and the Young England Movement represented for a time the idealism of those "Conservatives" who denounced the evils of the Industrial Revolution and the iniquities of the new Poor Law as heartily as did the Radicals of later years. The second spring of the movement, which we associate with the rise of the "Lux Mundi" school, does not come within Mr. Dawson's survey, but it is easy to see that it was not something entirely novel or foreign to the main tradition of the movement, but was the taking up afresh of a strand which had always been there.

The influence of Whately upon Newman forms an interesting phase in his intellectual progress. Whately appears as a kind of ecclesiastical Mr. Johnson, a burly philosopher who never tired of the sound of his own voice, who "used his friends as an anvil to beat out his ideas"—a process which the sensitive Newman must have found somewhat exhausting.

Newman, a subject of perennial interest, could hardly expect to escape the scalpel of the psycho-analyst (has not a distinguished scholar attempted to supply psycho-analytical methods even to so remote a figure as Ignatius of Antioch?), and we find Mr. Faber in *Oxford Apostles* rather unpleasantly employing these methods in a far-fetched attempt to explain the character of the leaders. The "moralism" which Professor Webb regards as their outstanding quality dissolves in Mr. Faber's hands into "an orgy of morbid emotionalism." Mr. Dawson deals with these fanciful theorizings as they deserve, and the great leaders emerge from his dispassionate scrutiny with reputations confirmed and perhaps enhanced, though it is a little surprising to learn that Keble was brusque and abrupt.

Mr. Dawson's sober restraint finds a congenial subject in the austerity of Newman's religious verse, and he traces something of the almost Semitic harshness of Calvinism in the outlook they manifest in contrast with "the sweetish flavour in religious poetry which contemporary English taste appreciated in *The Christian Year*. And on the note of apocalyptic prophecy he ends. The Tractarians foresaw that world apostasy which finds its embodiment in the atheism of modern Russia and the materialism of modern mass civilization. That the Russian campaign against religion is widespread and alarming is demonstrated in a useful little book, *Militant Atheism*, by Mgr. d'Herbigny. It should be pondered, for its author has collected a mass of facts and quotations which amply demonstrate his thesis. It requires no effort of imagination to envisage the coming struggle of which Newman speaks in the *Apologia*. "Then will be that stern encounter when two real and living principles, simple, entire, and consistent, one in the Church, the other out of it, at length rush upon each other, contending, not for names or words or half-views, but for elementary notions and distinctive moral characters."

It cannot be said that Mr. Leaky's compilation of accounts of *Conversions to the Catholic Church* will afford much aid in a conflict of principle. The motives indicated by the contributors seldom rise above the level of personal idiosyncrasy. Mr. Christopher Hollis makes the astonishing statement that Christ merely hurled dogmas at His hearers and never urged them to think things out for themselves! It is difficult to read the Gospels without discovering again and again the exact reverse of

this strange dictum. Nor are the other generalizations of the writers more convincing. Scripture and history might be non-existent so far as they are concerned.

M. DONAVAN.

JOHN R. MOTT: WORLD CITIZEN. By Basil Mathews. S.C.M. 12s. 6d.

As Mr. Mathews writes an attractive style, this book is sure to be read. At first sight we felt rather inclined to think that the amount of space devoted even to a man so well known as Mr. John R. Mott—there are 451 pages—excessive, but as we read this able book we modified our opinion, for this volume is in essence not merely Mr. John R. Mott but it is also his times, or rather the many movements, notably the missionary one, with which his name is associated. We do not wish the reader for a single moment to assume that the life and times depicted belong to the stock order of biography, for Mr. Mathews possesses the literary skill to blend the biography with the movements, and the result is one that carries the reader along from first page to last. In spite of its many attractions, our perusal left us stunned, as we contemplated the life led by Mr. Mott. We are hurried from place to place, from movement to movement, and the outcome is that we are left gasping for want of breath. If we may vary the German *obiter dictum*, it is the biography of a man who lives with haste and without rest. True, in one of the poignant passages of his diary Mr. Mott pleads for rest, and states the steps he took to achieve it. With all due respect to him we doubt if he really compassed this desirable aim of resting. The motto of our Air Force is *Per ardua ad astra*, which a countryman of Mr. Mott translated thus, The hustler gets to heaven. If he does, he surely gets to the heaven of the American who seems to us the embodiment of perpetual motion. Beyond all doubt Mr. Mott has been one of the main driving forces of the Student Missionary Movement, a Movement whose history is written at large over the colleges of the world, and for that signal achievement no little credit is to be placed to the account of Mr. Mott. The author does well to lay emphasis on this achievement, though we wonder if his subject is satisfied. In our college days we had the pleasure of hearing and meeting Mr. Mott, who then preached the evangelization of the world in that generation. The world is still to be evangelized, for the mills of God grind but slowly according to our human reckoning. At the same time very much has been achieved since Mr. Mott urged his message on the academic world of young men and young women throughout the world. Our only regret is that the man does not appear quite so much as the movements he has guided and controlled, but perhaps this is the very thing Mr. Mott himself would desire most.

R. H. MURRAY.

REVELATION AND THE HOLY SPIRIT: AN ESSAY IN BARTHIAN THEOLOGY.

By F. W. Camfield, D.D., with a Foreword by John McConnachie, D.D. Eliot Stock, D.D. 7s. 6d.

In producing this remarkable work at so low a price, the publishers must have reckoned on the discrimination of the theological world to ensure a wide circulation. The author's own view of the importance of the subject is indicated by the fact that he learned German for the express purpose of making a first-hand acquaintance with the teaching of Karl

Barth. The result is a brilliant piece of work, of extraordinary clarity and interest. It is to be hoped that it may justify the faith of the one and the labour of the other.

The thesis of the book is that Christianity is primarily revelation, and that this idea can only be grouped in the light of the New Testament conception of the Holy Spirit. Christianity claims to be its own witness: it is the approach of reality to man, not of man to reality. Revelation does not mean that "God is like Jesus"; but that God is in Christ, judging the world and the course of history. Barth, like Luther, bases everything on the action of God. Like Aulén in *Christus Victor* and Nygren in *Eros and Agape*, he nullifies the activity of man. Jesus as human is under sentence of death, like the rest of us: but by perfect self-surrender He is also in the fullest sense Lord and Christ. But this combination of Lordship and Humanity in one Person is the very opposite of the notion that perfect Humanity somehow equals Divinity. The combination is in itself an inexplicable paradox. We can only grasp it by means of Revelation: human faculties can provide no assistance. This Revelation is an act of God. It is in fact the Holy Spirit conceived of as God acting in complete transcendence. This is not Deism or dualism: man is nothing: God is all. The result is faith: and faith is a miracle. Man, it is true, is not purely passive: but his only contribution is continual surrender.

Dr. Camfield has a twofold quarrel with Catholic orthodoxy. First, he accuses it of rationalism in that it attempts to prove the foundations of the faith and justify them to human reason; and in that it lays stress on historical occurrences which cannot be directly revealed by the Holy Spirit. Secondly, he will not allow the statement that the Christian possesses God. The Christian, he maintains, is in this life under the judgment of God, not yet His son, but only destined to be when, like Jesus, he has submitted to death. The Chalcedonian theology seems to Dr. Camfield to be deficient in failing to draw out the necessary doctrine of the Holy Spirit; but in a notable passage he expresses his conviction of its superiority to anything which modern Liberalism has to offer in its stead.

It will be seen that the book is written in the full tide of reaction against modern humanistic tendencies. It is deeply tinged with the neo-Lutheran irrationalism, an attitude which will certainly provoke its own counter-reaction. Its pessimism in regard to the capacities of redeemed humanity seems strangely at variance with St. John, and even with St. Paul. But, for all that, it is a noble and refreshing work of pure theology.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

AFTER STRANGE GODS. A primer of modern heresy. T. S. Eliot. Faber and Faber. 3s. 6d.

In these lectures Mr. T. S. Eliot departs from literary criticism to apply a standard of orthodoxy to the modes of thinking and feeling revealed in that small amount of contemporary literature which is really important. He defines a tradition as "a way of feeling and acting which characterizes a group throughout generations." Every tradition must develop—"the word itself implies movement"—but no tradition can develop aright unless the intelligence of those who have it for their inheritance is deliberately directed to the maintenance of orthodoxy. Theologians have said this

before. It is something new and strange to hear a great poet and a great critic applying such a standard to literature.

His selection of contemporary heretics does not include Mr. Shaw or Lord Russell. The moral reformers of the last age had each his own personal point of view, which was lauded by their admirers and sampled by others, and then became an historical curiosity. The heretics of today are as individualistic, but they are no longer reformers, criticizing the tradition from the inside out of moral enthusiasm for some part of it. Hardy and D. H. Lawrence were both conscienceless; Hardy was content to live for self-expression, but Lawrence, the greater genius, embarked on a serious quest for an alternative spiritual tradition. And on that quest W. B. Yeats, the late Professor Irving Babbitt, and Mr. Ezra Pound have also started. ("To concentrate, not to dissipate; to renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connection between the individual and the race"; so, in an aside, Mr. Eliot defines "the struggle of our time.") But these have not found the spirit of New Mexico, or the Celtic twilight, or the wisdom of Confucius and Guido Cavalcanti. Each and all, they have been forced back on their own individualisms.

Here and there by way of contrast Mr. Eliot refers to "the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of my time." It should not surprise readers of "Portrait of the artist as a young man" to know that Mr. Joyce is meant. But there is one writer of equal or greater eminence whose orthodoxy could not be discussed in this book, but may be apprised from it. T. S. Eliot does not give us a final definition of orthodoxy in literature. In the true meaning of a much-abused word he is an educator leading others to search in the way where he himself has found.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

LES NORMES DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT CHRÉTIEN dans la littérature patristique des trois premiers siècles. Par D. Van den Eynde. Paris: Gabalda et Fils.

The publications of the University of Louvain are renowned for their accurate scholarship, and the present thesis is no exception. It is inspired by a consideration of the gap which exists between the Protestant picture of the early Church, as an originally free community of the Spirit which was compelled by the Gnostic menace to define its position and become a teaching Church, and the Catholic conception. Every scrap of available evidence is used and the author has little difficulty in shewing that the conception of authoritative revelation predominated from the first. There is no trace of opposition between the manifestations of the Spirit and the ordinary teaching of the Church. This teaching is based on the revelation of Christ, the predictions of the Old Testament prophets, and the apostolic preaching. There is a difference of emphasis: one type of mind dwells on the "deposit" left by Christ and His Apostles; the other type (the *savants*, or orthodox Gnostics) is preoccupied with the Old Testament. The importance of "tradition" in the Church goes back to the times when the Scriptures meant the Old Testament, the tradition the teaching of Christ and the Apostles.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD. R. G. Collingwood. Clarendon Press. 10s.

The theologian is well advised to cast his glance from time to time over the narrow wall that divides his domain from that of the philosopher, and see what his neighbour is about. He cannot but be aware of the immense influence on religious thought of Descartes and Kant and their successors in modern times, and of Plato and Aristotle throughout centuries of Christian history to the present day. But he may be deterred from studying contemporary philosophy by the strange and repellent jargon which, since Kant started it, has so often disguised the fair face of philosophic wisdom in dense obscurity. If so, let him try Mr. Collingwood, who combines acute reasoning and mature philosophic powers with an enviable urbanity and lucidity of style.

Mr. Collingwood's essay is ostensibly a technical treatise on philosophic method, but in fact it has a wider scope. It is a valuable explanation of the rationale of philosophic thought, and a defence of its validity against scepticism.

The argument is that a new inquiry into philosophic method is needed in view of the "exceptional difficulty which modern philosophers find in accepting each other's conclusions, and even in understanding each other's arguments." Philosophers fail to agree on principles of method, and that accounts for the "time of crisis and chaos" through which philosophy is passing.

We need, according to Mr. Collingwood, to distinguish the special features of philosophic thought, and to realize that it differs in method, as well as in content, from both the mathematical and the empirical sciences. Plato, though in the famous simile of the divided line he distinguished between philosophy and mathematics, did not drive the distinction deep enough. Descartes in practice recognized a difference, though in the *Discours* he overlooked it. Kant also made a distinction, but he had no satisfactory account to give of philosophical method. The same uncertainty prevails about the relation of philosophical method to the method of the empirical sciences. Whereas the logic of science divides the concept or logical genus into logical species, which are mutually exclusive and together exhaust the genus, philosophical thought can make no headway, if it tries to work with this rigid theory of classification and division. The traditional logic has to be modified in two ways before it applies to philosophy; it must allow for the "overlap of classes" and for a "scale of forms." The overlap of classes is the clue to the peculiarities of philosophic thinking; when, for instance, the moralist divides the good into the pleasant, the expedient, and the right, or classifies actions as performed through desire, self-interest, or duty, he is not working with mutually exclusive classes. And this overlap of classes runs through the whole field of philosophy.

Once these peculiarities are recognized, and the nature of philosophy recognized as a coming to know better what we already know in some measure, we can get beyond a mere critical destruction of false views or a mere analysis of propositions as the business of philosophy, and see philosophy as constructive reasoning about the really existent, essentially systematic and not a set of untransferable personal interpretations of experience, with no validity except for their creators.

Space does not permit of any examination in detail of the persuasive

argument in which Mr. Collingwood expounds this thesis. We can only commend it as a refreshingly lucid and closely reasoned statement of a philosopher's faith in the validity of his quest for truth. Christian thinkers will certainly read it with sympathetic appreciation of its positive and constructive quality and its refutation of those dreary scepticisms which would negative the very possibility of a valid theory of the nature of things.

H. BALMFORTH.

OXFORD AND THE GROUPS. Edited by R. H. S. Crossman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 5s.

THE MEANING OF THE GROUPS. Edited by Rev. H. A. M. Spencer. London: Methuen and Co.

THE GROUP MOVEMENT. By Linton Smith and Dean F. Underhill. S.P.C.K. 6d.

The Group Movement may be, as Mr. Auden points out in a dispassionate and rather devastating estimate of it in *Oxford and the Groups*, a phenomenon entirely explicable as the natural social and psychological desire of middle-class persons for "release" and dictatorship, having thus a political aspect like Fascism. Or it may be, as Miss Evelyn Underhill in the other symposium, *The Meaning of the Groups*, suggests, the recurrence of a spiritual phenomenon frequently observed in the course of Church History, having affinities with Montanism, the Waldensians, the Moravians, and the Wesleyans. It may be, indeed, true that both aspects are to be taken into consideration, and doubtless not a few people will be relieved to find that it is not so novel nor so startling as it appears. What is different in this Movement is the character of its publicity and the methods of its propaganda, and it is these which give it not only the very wide interest it has awakened, but some of the particular problems it suggests. It is not a little thing, for instance, that the taboo against conversation on spiritual topics in polite society has been broken through, and that the class of people whom the leaders of religion found it hardest to approach have become thus bewilderingly accessible. On the other hand, one cannot but fear that this sudden publicity, and the rush of people of all sorts into print about the Movement, is likely to make a just estimate of it only all the more difficult. The short pamphlet from the pens of the Bishop and Dean of Rochester illustrates the difficulty. Their tone is very judicious: they avoid the fearless analysis to which the Bishop of Durham subjected the Movement, but they do not really help one much to understand it, though they commend it to the careful and sympathetic attention of Churchmen.

The other two books draw between them on a wide circle of observers. While the one confines itself to residents of Oxford, the other includes the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, two physicians, Professor Bardsley Brash, Dr. Jacks, and Father Ronald Knox. It will be thus seen that a representative number of highly intelligent persons comments on the Movement. All are clearly sympathetic. The temper of every essay is very different from Butler's often quoted dismissal of Wesley. The groups cannot complain of any lack of wish on the part of religious leaders to appreciate the good in their work. The question remains whether the groups will take to heart the wise and kindly suggestions contained in some of the criticisms. Professor Grensted's summing up in the

Oxford book seems to suggest that some at least of the leaders of the Movement are prepared to note and avoid dangers. The Rev. Geoffrey Allen's defence of the Movement, on the other hand, shews something of the bigotry of the convert. He not only blackens his own past, but gives a really distorted view of spiritual conditions in Oxford; he offends by assuming that only by means of the Group Movement can any progress in the spiritual life of Society be achieved.

Probably readers who are willing to be stimulated without becoming definitely attached to the Groups will benefit most from these books. Dr. Raven in the *Meaning of the Groups* writes a masterly essay which it would do any Christian man good to ponder carefully. For, like others, he sees that the Groups have re-emphasized truths which Christians were likely to forget, and have issued a challenge which all Christians ought to accept. He uses an unusual illustration comparing the zeal of "Groupers" to the excitement of "betrothal."

Both books contain sayings and stories of Group members which could be easily used in sweeping condemnation of the Movement, but a careful reading shews that no such intention was in the minds of the writers. They all differentiate between the extravagances of the irresponsible and the mind of the leaders. But warnings there are in plenty that if the Movement is to achieve its highest purpose its leaders must be more prepared to take a long view and a deep view of the problems of psychology, sociology, and theology. At present they seem to be still too easily tempted to use short cuts, and so to underestimate the stubbornness of age-long problems.

The Meaning of the Groups contains a very odd sort of Imprimatur from the Bishop of London, opposite the title-page.

PETER STERRY: PLATONIST AND PURITAN, 1613-72. A Selection from his Writings, with a Biographical and Critical Study. By Vivian de Sola Pinto. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

We congratulate, and we congratulate most warmly, Professor de Sola Pinto for filling a vacant place on our shelves where are our volumes of the thinkers of the seventeenth century. He has spared no pains in his researches, and we have now a volume full of ripe spiritual wisdom, the wisdom that comes from the Puritanic and the Platonic strains blended. No doubt, like all leaders, Sterry had occasion to employ the prayer, "O Lord, deliver me not from mine enemies but from my friends, notably my extreme friends." Harry Vane and Peter Sterry suffered many things at the hands of men who did not understand their respective positions and who also misrepresented them, and they suffered not least from the Vanites and the Sterryites, as their more advanced followers were denominated. We have, we trust, advanced considerably from the days when even Richard Baxter, referring to the Vanites and the Sterryites, uttered the poor pun of Vanity and Sterility, and Professor de Sola Pinto's volume will render additional advance even easier. A day was to come when Baxter atoned for this judgment, for he declared of Sterry's book on Free-will that "His Preface is a most excellent Perswasive to Universal Charity: Love was never more extolled than throughout his Book. Doubtless his head was strong, his wit admirably pregnant, his searching studies hard and sublime, and, I think, his heart replenished with holy Love to God,

and great charity, moderation, and peaceableness towards men: In so much that I heartily repent that I so far believed fame as to think somewhat hardlier or less charitably of him and his few adherents than I now hope they did deserve. Hasty judging, and believing fame, is a cause of unspeakable hurt to the world, and injury to our brethren. But I find it no wonder that he was understood by few, For his sublime and philosophical notions, met not with many Auditors, so well studied in those things as to be capable of understanding them. It is a great inconvenience to men of extraordinary discoveries and sublimity, that they must speak to very few."

The man deserves attention, and Professor de Sola Pinto unites together the scattered pieces of information bearing upon Sterry at his disposal, and unites them skilfully. As he claims that Sterry is a true poet, the spiritual brother of George Herbert, Richard Crashaw and Henry Vaughan, and as he holds that he possesses spiritual affinities with Milton, Spinoza, and the Cambridge Platonists, a school of thought that in our own day has not yet come into its own, we were intrigued by the presentation of one whom the author has made so much better known to us. Here and there we find ourselves in disagreement with the author, but for that there is no source of wonder, though we gratefully remember that disagreement provokes thought. For instance, in the spring of 1654 Cromwell selected Sterry as a member of the Board of Commissioners or "Triers" for the approval or the disapproval of public preachers in the Church. We assent to this statement, but we are afraid that we do not altogether assent to the statement that the scheme of a Broad National Church was a darling one of the Protector. Members of the Church of England then would certainly have queried such a point of view as being that and primarily animating the Protector.

The writings and the doctrine of Sterry receive careful consideration, and certainly Professor de Sola Pinto has spent elaborate pains on the investigation of the pedigree of the thought of this Puritan-Platonist. The sale catalogue of his library naturally does not fully represent the range of his reading. Still, it includes the poets Homer, Pindar, Euripides, Apollonius Rhodius, Terence, Plautus, Virgil, Horace and Persius; the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus, Dio Cassius and Diodorus Siculus. Among the philosophers, in addition to two complete Aristotles there is, as we should expect, a strong array of Platonists and Alexandrians, Christian and Pagan, such as Origen and St. Clement, Plutarch and Maximus Tyrius, Plotinus and Iamblichus, Porphyry and Proclus and the pseudo-Dionysius, as well as the Fathers, Tertullian, the Puritan Father, and Athanasius. There are also the Greek romances of Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus. Among modern philosophy we find the Jew Maimonides and the Italian Ficino, the Frenchman Descartes and the Englishmen Bacon and Henry More, while Renaissance scholarship is represented by Scaliger, Lipsius, Casaubon, Vossius, and Selden; romance by Barclay's "Argenis" and poetry by Tasso's "Gerusalemme Liberata" and "Aminta." Theology and Church history also find a place: so do a number of philological writings and a striking collection of geographical and topographical books ranging from Strabo and Ptolemy to Camden. Nor is humour absent, for we encounter Lucian, Scarron's "Virgile Travesty," and the "Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum." Possibly his family kept his Plato and Behmen, his Shakespeare and Fletcher, for they do not figure in the sale catalogue. Of Sterry's reading there can be no doubt, and there can be as little doubt of his spiritual insight.

R. H. MURRAY.

THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. By C. J. Wright, Ph.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s.

Dr. Wright, who is Tutor in Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Religion in Didsbury College, Manchester, tells us that this book was written "almost unawares" in a few weeks' time. It is a great performance in the circumstances, and we think he will wish to produce a larger volume on his subject at no distant date. At present he stands half-way between the position of Dr. E. F. Scott and the traditional view familiar to an earlier generation in the writings of Dr. Westcott. He might, we think, have referred more definitely to the development of thought on the Fourth Gospel during the past twenty years, in particular to the late Dr. Burney's *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, which has influenced Dr. Wright perhaps more than he knows. He considers the author of the Gospel to be "anonymous," but a Jew who had known the Lord, and a friend of John the Apostle at Ephesus. He was "the historian of the consciousness of Jesus, a Human Figure with a unique conscious filial relation to God." Dr. Wright probably overstates his contrast when he insists that the Gospel is "not metaphysical, but experiential"; but he well expresses his dissent from Scott's view that "the author rests his account of the Christian Revelation on a speculative idea borrowed from Philo." He thinks that the separation often made by students between "truths of fact" and "truths of faith" may be annulled by penetrating to the historic consciousness of Jesus Himself. He believes strongly in the message of essential mysticism, which the Fourth Gospel holds for the modern world, quoting with approval the sentence: "Le Dieu défini, c'est le Dieu fini." Christology, he holds, must be inductive: "The Church historicized her metaphysical concepts and regarded the result as the historic Jesus. The lesson is surely this: that our future Christologies must be based on the historic fact of Jesus, and must never obscure Him." He does not accept the propitiatory view of the Atonement, and attempts to counter the quotation of 1 John ii. 2 ("He is the propitiation of our sins") by pointing out that *ἱλασμός* is cognate to the verb in the Publican's prayer, "God be merciful to me, a sinner" (*ἱλάσθητί μοι*) (Luke xviii. 13); in this we think he forgets that the imperative verb is in the *passive* voice! We hope Dr. Wright will in time discover that the Creeds can be metaphysical without ceasing to be experiential; meanwhile we must thank him for a fascinating contribution to his subject. He says beautifully: "The love of which eternal life speaks is not an abstraction; it is a reality. . . . The basis of all Ethics is the God who loves and is loved."

J. H. McCUBBIN.

MORALITY AND REALITY. By E. Graham Howe. Gerald Howe. 6s.

These lectures delivered to the Home and School Council contain a great deal from which theologians and pastors may learn. The author is a Harley Street doctor-psychologist and quite rightly uses terms to suit the needs of his own department of science. He starts from the clash between teaching, which claims to shew another how he should live, and psycho-analysis, which, at least theoretically, disclaims outside interference. How much teaching can be justified psychologically?

Reality, for Dr. Howe, is "that which is now, which is not, as a whole, what I want." Morality is my idea of "what ought to be." Bad teaching

inculcates morality, neglecting reality. "Morality" generally (there is a good morality) invents its way of escape from things as they are, and a sense of achievement at the same time. It has an endless capacity for faking facts. Love is prepared to accept what it does not like—i.e. reality as a whole. After these preliminaries we reach the problem of education. The nursery "good child" is often the child who responds to our effort to disregard the time factor, who unhealthily conforms to our idea of what is convenient. If we are to help the child, we must accept him as he is now. Our part is to mediate reality to him, certainly not to shield him from the consequences of his action. This will be the criterion of punishment: Does it, or does it not, represent in its limited sphere the action of things as they are upon one who has to live in a society? The lecturer bases his philosophy on many cases known to him in which harm has been done both by the adult's substituting private "morality" for reality, and by undue kindness—shielding the child from reality. Lastly, a very important point, reality is "things as they are now"; it is therefore always changing.

The lectures contain some memorable sayings. "In life we are engaged in the service of a mystery rather than an act of mastery" (p. 16). "We are living . . . in an age of darkness, in a period of very deep spiritual depression . . . of exaggerated importance attached to matters of having and doing" (p. 107). "It is still regarded as deplorably unscientific to include death as of any importance or significance in the span of life. . . . I believe we shall never fully gain either true proportion or complete good humour until we can see the whole, regarding death as part of life . . ." (p. 128).

I wonder if Dr. Howe could have been so helpful if he had not given years of intense application to what is after all, for a doctor, "having and doing." But the real challenge of his lectures, which suggest now a Quaker, now a Catholic, upbringing, lies in his indictment of an acquisitive society. Does not his philosophy, consistently worked out, discourage the revolutionary and tend to the deification of things as they are? And would not this in practice mean that those who have the vision of humility, of being rather than doing, would retire in favour of the violent and acquisitive? Psychology without religion, the knowledge, that is, of the personal God who transcends things as they appear to our vision, does not take us very far. But religious people, above all, need to guard against overprizing their "morality" and identifying it with God's will.

In the sphere of national life Dr. Howe may be right. It is arguable that it is better for the thoughtful minority to accept a revolution with all its faults than to struggle against it. This was the teaching of Jeremiah in a parallel case and led to the conservation of spiritual values. The evolution of Fascist Italy certainly suggests that the undesirable features of a revolution will be outlived sooner if all submit to reality.

One of Dr. Howe's methods should have been explained. He lays stress on "holy" as meaning the man who is "whole," and even connects the word with "hole" and "hell." The theologian, knowing that the English terms translate Greek words completely unconnected with each other, may think this mere trifling with verbal assonances. To the psychologist the fact that kindred English words were chosen to represent different Greek words is significant; but why it is significant deserves explanation.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

BOOK NOTES

The Royal Banners. By Dom Bernard Clements, O.B.S. All who have heard Dom Bernard preach will want to read this book simply for the sake of seeing and hearing the author again. It reads as Dom Bernard speaks. It literally brings the preacher before your eyes. There is the same tenderness, the swift humour, the strong appeal. It is just Dom Bernard, and because it is so criticism is almost impossible. Who wants to criticize such a personal revelation? Those who have not heard Dom Bernard preach will certainly want to do so when they have read this book.

W. E. L.

Loyalty and Order. By D. H. S. Cranage, B.D., Litt.D. Pp. 76. Milford. 1s. 6d. Sermons preached before the University of Oxford and in Norwich Cathedral on Prayer Book Revision and the Oxford Movement. The Dean of Norwich deprecates the copying of Roman ways in the furnishing of altars and the vesting of clergy, seeing that there are seemly and dignified Anglican examples. He deplores the excessive liberties taken with the Prayer Book, pointing out that obedience is a better prelude to reform than licence. He reviews the 1927 and 1928 attempts at Prayer Book revision and advocates a further attempt, preluded by an endeavour to arrive at greater unity in the matter within the Church of England.

H. L. C.

Direction in Prayer. Edited by Patrick Thompson. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d. The death of a valued reviewer, who was studying this book with a view to a thorough discussion of it, which was never finished, makes it necessary to content ourselves with a brief note. The book comes from the Society of Retreat Conductors, and gives in short compass a history of prayer and its methods, largely from the standpoint of the director.

The Catholic Rule of Life. By K. D. Mackenzie. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d. *Youth goes to Church.* By Peter Winckworth. S.P.C.K. 6d. The failure of a reviewer to keep his promise regarding Mr. Mackenzie's valuable book leaves us in the sad position of having to be content with a bare note. Let it be sufficient to say that the writer shews his accustomed urbanity and scholarly skill. The pamphlet proves that the book has already fulfilled its purpose, because on its material the association of Young Anglo-Catholics led by Mr. Winckworth has based its programme.

Bricks and Mortar. By a Religious of St. Peter's Community, Kilburn. C.L.A. 1s. 6d. A story dealing with Sisters and the St. Pancras Housing Scheme, of a type which publishers and booksellers generally avoid. If the C.L.A. can get a circulation for such books, it will be doing a very worthwhile work, in which we wish it Godspeed.

W. K. L. C.